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SHIFTING SANDS: A META-THEORY FOR PUBLIC ACCESS AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY ALONG THE COAST

Melissa K. Scanlan*
Over half of the United States population currently lives near a coast. As
shorelines are used by more people, developed by private owners, and altered by
extreme weather, competition over access to water and beaches will intensify, as
will the need for a clearer legal theory capable of accommodating competing
private andpublic interests. One such public interest is the ability to walk along
the beach, which seems simple enough. However, beach walking often occurs on
this ambulatory shoreline where public rights grounded in the public trust
doctrine and private rights grounded in property ownership intersect. To
varying degrees, each state has a public trust doctrine that defines public rights
on beaches. The extent to which a court subscribes to a sovereignty theory
influences the outcome for public rights. Under this theory, the public trust
doctrine is an attribute of state sovereignty, and as such, the states lack the
power to eliminate it. Applying a sovereignty theory leads courts to
conceptualizepublic trust rights as an inalienableeasement that burdens coastal
private property, regardless of its omission in the recorded deed. Courts that
interpret coastal property in this way allow for a coexistence of public and
private rights that accommodates shared uses of the beach, consistent with
centuries of English common law. In contrast, courts that theorize that state
power includes the power to transfer public trust property into private
ownership free of public rights view the public trust doctrine as an ownership
doctrine, drawing a distinct line in the sand dividingpublic use from privatefee
simple estates. These courts tend to favor exclusive use of the beach by private
landowners, asserting that the dividing line for title purposes is also the
boundaryfor all public rights. This Article examines divergent approaches to
public access to beaches across the United States, demonstrates how legal
theory influences substantive public and private rights, and discusses takings
considerationson beaches. The Article suggests thatpublic and private interests
are best served by a historically grounded sovereignty theory-recognizing that
a public trust easement always burdens coastal private titles-coupled with a
theory of evolving public rights. These backgroundprinciples not only protect
shared uses of the beach, but also provide greater clarity regarding what
constitutes a taking ofcoastalproperty.
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INTRODUCTION

In a Wisconsin village on Lake Michigan's coast, private property owners
asked the village to fence off the beach to keep the public out. Just across the
Lake, adjacent to Michigan's Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore, a
homeowners' association posted signs declaring the beach to be private
property.2 Moving out from the Great Lakes to the Pacific Ocean, the Los
Angeles Urban Rangers educated the public about beach access and how to react
to private property owners' efforts to dissuade the public from reaching the
beach in Malibu, such as hiring private security guards and posting faux "private
property" signs that adorn parking spaces and access roads.3 On the Atlantic

1.

See Adam W. McCoy, Shorewood Going to Plan B on Atwater Beach Security Fence,

SHOREWOOD PATCH (Nov. 10, 2011, 2:18 PM), http://shorewood.patch.com/groups/politics-andelections/p/village-going-to-plan-b-on-atwater-beach-security-fence.
2. On May 10, 2011, the Author observed the posted signs while visiting Michigan's
Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore.
3.

See Jenny Price, Guide to Malibu's Hidden Beaches, LA OBSERVED (Aug. 11, 2006,

10:36 PM), http://www.laobserved.com/intell/2006/08/guide to malibus hidden beache.php. The
Los Angeles Urban Rangers take groups on beach tours in which:
[They] instruct their participants to stake out spots on public easements-the patch of
sand between the ocean and private property that the public is legally permitted to
occupy. Easements can be difficult to discern because they literally shift with the tide-
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Ocean, a small business owner litigated a case to the Supreme Court of Maine to
obtain recognition of the public right to simply cross the tidelands to scuba dive. 4
Beaches, whether they are along oceans or lakes, constitute an example of
contentious property where private interests bump up against public interests.
Like other shared commons,6 beaches can be public spaces that seem private,
become private, or have no public access. Conversely, coastal property owners
may perceive beaches as private spaces in danger of redefinition as shared public
spaces by eminent domain, by easements, or-unconstitutionally-through
takings without just compensation.8 In legal terms, the questions are: Does the
public retain the right to use the beach despite the legal title held by private
landowners? Does private title determine all rights, or does private title to the
beach contain inherent limitations in favor of the public? The answers to these
legal questions are influenced by whether a court subscribes to a "sovereignty
theory" of public trust property that restricts a state's power to privatize trust
property and eliminate public rights.
As a general matter of property law across the United States, ownership of
the dry uplands above the ordinary or mean high-water mark9 is private and

the official boundary is the mean high-tide line over the last several months. Once
situated, participants are asked to perform typical 'beach activities,' such as yoga,
building sand castles and reading trashy magazines. The intent, according to the Rangers,
is for people to exercise their right to be on the beach as demonstratively as possible.
David Ng, Urban Rangers on 'Safari' in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at E5.

4.

See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 623 (Me. 2011).

5.
See Stephanie Reckord, Limiting the Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine in New
Jersey: A Way to Protect and Preserve the Rights of Private Ownership, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.

249, 249 (2005) ("Oceanfront property presents unique conflicts between public and private notions
of property law.").
6. Other shared commons include, but are not limited to, roads, sidewalks, alleys, the
Internet, and fisheries. See Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open
Commons in the Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1499, 1499 (2013).
7.
See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, In Battle over Malibu Beaches, an App Unlocks Access, N.Y.

TIviES, June 13, 2013, at A14 (revealing that, even though the beaches of Malibu are public, only
about seven of the twenty-seven miles of Malibu beaches are accessible by the public, and
homeowners go to great lengths to make it appear that the beaches are private).
8.

See, e.g., Erika Kranz, Sand for the People: The Continuing Controversy over Public

Access to Florida'sBeaches, 83 FLA. B.J. 11, 11 (June 2009) (discussing the ownership issues that
beachfront property owners may face).
9. Ordinaryand mean are terms of art used to modify the terms high- and low-water mark.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20 (2011) ("The seaward boundary of all property within the State
of North Carolina, not owned by the State, which adjoins the ocean, is the mean high-water mark.");
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1302 (2012) ('Natural or ordinary high-water mark' means the high water
elevation in a lake over a period of years . . . ."). Mean high- and low-water mark are generally
employed when discussing ocean beaches, while ordinaryhigh- and low-water mark are generally
used to refer to lake beaches. See JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 15 (1994). Because this Article discusses cases from oceans

and lakes, the Author attempts to avoid confusion from these different terms of art by simply calling
this zone between ordinary or mean high- and low-water marks the "public/private beach zone."

Published by Scholar Commons, 2013

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

298

[VOL. 65: 295

established in the upland owner's fee to the land. 10 Likewise, ownership below
the mean or ordinary low-water mark of tidal or "navigable" waters is
uniformly in the state, and the public's right to use the water in the oceans and
navigable lakes and rivers is rarely contested.12 However, the zone between the
ordinary or mean high- and low-water marks, referred to as the "public/private
beach zone" in this Article, is subject to variable state interpretations of property
rights that impact public access and private rights on the beach.13 In some states,
the private owner of the upland takes title all the way to the low-water mark.14
However, in most states, private property stops at the high-water mark, and the
public has the fee below this line-subject to certain private riparian or littoral
rights.15 This public/private beach zone, as well as the scope of public rights
within it, is the primary focus of this Article. The narrowness of this strip of
beach belies the complexity and controversy that accompany it.16
Rules governing coastal property boundaries and legal rights are complex
because of the variation among states in types of water bodies, navigability
determinations, and alterations based on nature and climate change-water level

10. See Kenneth K. Kilbert, The PublicTrust Doctrineand the Great Lakes Shores, 58 CLEV.

ST. L. REV. 1, 17 (2010). However, in states like New Jersey and Oregon, the upland owner's fee
does not include the right to exclude. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d
355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (basing its holding on the public trust doctrine); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,
462 P.2d 671, 673, 678 (Or. 1969) (basing its holding on custom instead of the public trust
doctrine).
11. Navigable, as it is used here, means navigable for title waters. Rivers "are navigable in
fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
and travel on water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). While uncommon, a
few states-such as Arizona-have gone to great lengths to define most of the waters within their
borders as non-navigable and not held in trust by the state. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18
P.3d 722, 737 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting a legislative attempt to increase the standard of proof
required for the state to determine that a river is navigable); Tracey Dickman Zobenica, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053, 1064 (1996) (citing ARIZ. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 37-1128(H), (I) (1995)) ("The law required legislative approval of any determination
of navigability.").
12. See Kilbert, supra note 10, at 17.
13. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: ClassificationsofStates, PropertyRights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2007) (discussing the public trust doctrines of thirty-one eastern states).
14. See, e.g., Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass.

1961) (drawing the private property boundary at the low-water mark).
15. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:35 (2013) (citations
omitted). See, e.g., Dorroh v. McCarthy, 462 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ga. 1995) (drawing state property
boundary at the high-water mark).
16. See Kilbert, supra note 10, at 2 ("The shores of the Great Lakes may look serene, but
they are a battleground.").
17. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2597 (2010) ("Generally speaking, state law defines property interests ... including property rights
in navigable waters and the lands underneath them. . . ." (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524

U.S. 156, 164 (1998))).
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fluctuations, erosion, and accretion.18 Unlike inland roperty boundaries, water
boundaries adjacent to land are usually ambulatory. Because water is always
in motion, property boundaries adjacent to water are also more fluid.20 In
addition, ownership of private land adjacent to navigable waters is always
subject to the federal government's navigation servitude, which allows the
government to destroy private property without compensation in aid of
navigation.21 Similarly, along navigable and tidal waters, private property rights
are generally understood in relation to the state's trustee role over those waters
and the lands beneath them.22 Thus, private land adjacent to lakes and oceans is
always, in many senses, ambulatory as well as contingent and subject to
paramount public rights. 23
Perhaps because of this variability in the property boundaries and the state
laws that govern them, scholarly work on the public trust doctrine and beach

18. After a storm altered a beach on the Gulf of Mexico so dramatically that the homes were
completely seaward of the vegetation line, the State of Texas ordered the private property owners to
remove the homes from the public beach. Celeste Pagano, Where 's the Beach? CoastalAccess in
the Age of Rising Tides, 42 SW. L. REv. 1, 36 (2012) (critiquing the Texas Supreme Court for
rejecting rolling easements in favor of the homeowner (citing Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d
705 (Tex. 2012))).
19. See Shasta Greene, Book Review: Water Boundaries: Demystifying Land Boundaries
Adjacent to Tidal or Navigable Waters, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208 (2003).
20. See Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 722.

21. United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 596-97 (1941)
(citations omitted) (holding that the navigation servitude extends up to the ordinary high-water mark
on a navigable stream); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 88 (1913)
(denying compensation for private oyster beds that were destroyed pursuant to the navigation
servitude for dredging Great South Bay in New York); Scranton v. Wheeler, 71 N.W. 1091, 1092
(Mich. 1897) (declaring the interests of a riparian owner in the submerged lands bordering on public
navigable water held subject to government's navigational servitude). The no takings/compensation
rule does not apply to waters made navigable by a private owner's expense and alterations. Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that imposing a navigational
servitude on a marina that was created and rendered navigable through private expense constituted a
taking when the area had originally been a pond that was not considered navigable). This federal
power under the navigational servitude to destroy property free of a takings claim is similar to the
takings immunity enjoyed by the states pursuant to the public trust doctrine. JAMES RASBAND ET
AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 832-33 (2004) (citing Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul &

Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. at 596-97). Further, although some variability exists in the definition of the
ordinary high-water mark, "it essentially means the point on the shore where the water stands
sufficiently long to destroy vegetation below it or otherwise create a visible line" under the federal
navigation servitude. Kilbert, supra note 10, at 25.
22. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 9 (citing Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382

(1981)).
23. See Joseph J. Kalo, North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public Waters and
Beaches: The Rights of the Littoral Owners in the Twenty-First Century, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1427,

1438 (2005) ("Thus, an oceanfront property owner's seaward boundary is not a fixed boundary line,
but an ambulatory one." (citing JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS

§

155 at

310-11 (Chicago, Callagan & Co. 2d ed. 1891))).
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property tends to either focus on a single state's laws24 or present comparative
descriptions of a variety of state laws.25 A few scholars provide theoretical
frameworks that aid in interpreting the legal variability across jurisdictions.26
This Article builds upon that scholarship by analyzing divergent state approaches
to public access to coastal property through a theoretical lens. The Article
argues for theories of state sovereignty, property, and public rights that strike a
balance between being historically grounded, yet flexible enough to meet the
demands of contemporary society.
When new states entered the Union on equal footing with the original
thirteen states, the federal government transferred title to the new states over the
submerged lands beneath all navigable and tidal waters within their boundaries
up to the ordinary or mean high-water mark. 27 To varying degrees, each state

24. See, e.g., Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View
into the Trustees' World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123 (2012) (focusing primarily on Wisconsin's public

trust doctrine).
25. See, e.g., Sidney F. Ansbacher et al., Stop the Beach Renourishment Stops Private
Beachowners' Right to Exclude the Public, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 43, 44-45 (2010) (citing Stop the

Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010)) (discussing the
public trust doctrine in Florida, Montana, Hawaii, and Texas); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative
Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the
Evolution Toward an EcologicalPublic Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 84-198 (2010) (comparing the

application of the public trust doctrine in nineteen western states); Craig, supra note 13 (conducting
a coastal state survey related to public trust rights); Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public
Trust in Surface Waterways and Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L.

REFORM 907 (2007) (comparing the Great Lakes states' doctrinal approaches).
26. See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of Sovereignty: The
HistoricBasis for the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM

861, 869-902 (2007) (citations omitted) (providing the historical basis for the overlapping rights
theory); Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation
Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 655-65 (2010) (citations omitted) (drawing out divergent
legal theories); Mackenzie S. Keith, Judicial Protectionfor Beaches and Parks: The Public Trust
Doctrine Above the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 165, 189-91

(2010) (citations omitted) (arguing for an amphibious extension of the public trust doctrine to
uplands and parklands, which as public gathering spaces, are inherently public and valued for
"sociability" purposes); Kilbert, supra note 10, at 17 (calling for consistent theory across the Great
Lakes); Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public Trust
Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 61-63 (2011) (citations

omitted) (exploring the theoretical basis for how states-as sovereigns and holders of the public
trust-possess the ability to limit coastal development while avoiding regulatory takings liability);
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,53

U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 722-23 (1986) (urging that inherently public property doctrines-such as
dedication, custom, and the public trust doctrine-which have traditionally been used to ensure
public access to roads and waterways, are equally applicable to lands customarily used for public
gatherings because they increase the "sociability" value of those lands).
27. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894); see also Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,
381 (1891) (stating that when the federal government granted newly formed states title to
submerged land, the boundary for the title was from the submerged land to the high-water mark).
The rule that states hold title to navigable and tidal waters in their sovereign capacity has its origins
in English common law. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1226 (2012). In PPL
Montana, the Supreme Court noted that, under the equal footing doctrine, "a State's title to these
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has defined a public trust doctrine under state law to govern the management of
these waters and the lands underlying them.28 Many states ground their public
trust doctrine in English common law. 9
However, as in property law more generally, states diverge regarding the
rights inherent in coastal private property titles and the degree to which private
titles are, and always have been, subject to a public trust easement.30
Specifically, in determining public rights on beaches, states define the property
at issue and the activities protected as public rights.31 A state that bases its
public trust doctrine on English common law and an easement theory of
overlapping rights in the public/private beach zone will protect the public's right
to walk freely along beaches.
In contrast, states that ground their property
rights in state law-without regard to English common law precedent-are more
likely to draw a distinct line in the sand between public and private titles and
favor exclusive use of the shoreline by private landowners.
Thus, the key
difference is whether courts view the dividing line for title purposes as the
boundary for all public rights or whether courts recognize a public trust easement
overlapping the private title.34 The meta-theory driving a court's decision to use
a lineal title or an easement approach considers whether the public trust doctrine
is an attribute of state sovereignty such that it is beyond the power of the state to
redefine public trust property as private property and eliminate public rights.35

lands was conferred not by Congress but by the Constitution itself." Id. at 1227 (quoting Oregon ex
rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
28. See PPL Mont, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1235 ("Under accepted principles of federalism, the
States retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over waters within their
borders, while federal law determines riverbed title under the equal-footing doctrine.").
29.

ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.

30. See generally Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 26, at 57-58 (citations omitted) (noting that
states vary in their treatment of public trust rights and private rights in coastal property).
31. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2597 (2010) ("Generally speaking, state law defines property interests,... including property rights
in navigable waters and the lands underneath them ..... (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524
U.S. 156, 164 (1925))).
32. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005) (basing the public trust
doctrine on sovereignty theory in holding that the public has a right to walk along the shoreline of
Lake Huron).
33. See, e.g., Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 275, 278
(Mass. 1961) (relying on state statutes to extend littoral owners' property boundary to the low-tide
mark of a newly formed beach extending from the original property, thereby enjoining public use of
the newly formed beach).
34. Compare Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 78 (holding that public trust doctrine allows public use of
shoreline from high-water mark and below, which overlaps with riparian owners' private property
rights), with Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 398 (Wis. 1923) ("The riparian owner's rights to the
shore are exclusive as to all the world, excepting only where those rights conflict with the rights of
the public for navigation purposes.").
35. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 360-63, 365 (N.J.
1984) (citations omitted) (relying on state sovereignty and the public trust doctrine to decide a
private beachfront club to open up to the public).
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Additionally, whether a court views public rights as fixed or evolving
36
influences the types of rights protected in the public/private beach zone. A few
courts view public trust rights as fixed in time, usually at a point during the
seventeenth century formation of the colonies, while most courts interpret public
rights as evolving with society to encompass current public uses of the trust
property.3 7 One might assume that courts adopting a fixed seventeenth century
approach to public rights would also adopt a more historically grounded
approach to the property line question. However, the opposite is true: courts
adopting a fixed approach to public rights adopt a lineal title approach to the
property boundary that is not based on English common law. 38 For those courts,
the common thread is a focus on establishing fixed property lines and rights.3 9
This Article examines public access to beaches across the United States and
demonstrates how a court's choice of legal theory influences the outcome. For
instance, even when comparing two states that identically draw the private
property boundary at the low-water mark, the outcome for public rights differs
based on the theories undergirding courts' decisions. Part II frames the Article
by describing current controversies over beach access and the importance of
coastal areas. Part III turns to the historical origins of beach property and the
public trust doctrine in the United States and England. To provide context to
current controversies and the sovereignty meta-theory, this Part describes the
equal footing doctrine and the federal government's transfer of navigable waters
and their beds up to the ordinary or mean high-water mark to each state as it
entered the Union. Part IV identifies the competing legal theories courts apply to
resolve beach access controversies. Part V analyzes court decisions that apply
these theories to beach property. This Part clusters the case analysis around
states that come from the same legal foundation, such as the Massachusetts Bay
Colony and the Northwest Territories. It then explains the role of takings claims

36. Compare Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell 1l), 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me. 1989) (declaring
legislation that gave the public the right to use private littoral owners' intertidal land for purposes
other than fishing, fowling, and navigation was an unconstitutional taking), with Borough of
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54, 55 (N.J. 1972) (extending the
application of the public trust doctrine to recreational uses and precluding a municipality from
discriminating against nonresidents using the public beach).
37. See Benjamin Donahue, Comment, McGarvey v. Whittredge: Continued Uncertainty in
Maine's IntertidalZone, 64 ME. L. REv. 593, 599 (2012) ("Few states have limited the scope of the
public's easement within the intertidal zone to traditional uses.").
38. See, e.g., Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169 (adopting a fixed approach to public rights and a lineal
title approach to property boundaries); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d
273, 277, 278 (Mass. 1961) (adopting a fixed approach to public rights and a lineal title approach to
property boundaries); Doemel, 193 N.W. at 395, 398 (adopting a fixed approach to public rights and
a lineal title approach to property boundaries).
39. See Bell II, 557 A.2d at 180 ("[O]wners, occupiers, buyers, and sellers of shorefront land
were entitled to rely upon their property rights as so defined."); Michaelson, 173 N.E. 2d at 278 ("A
littoral owner takes his property with the knowledge that the boundary may change by accretion or
reliction. This is a necessary condition of owning property along tidal waters."); Doemel, 193 N.W.
at 398 ("[W]e cannot disturb the interests which have become so vested.").
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related to beach access. Part VI suggests public and private interests are best
served by a historically grounded sovereignty theory recognizing that a public
trust easement burdens coastal property, coupled with a theory of evolving

public rights. These background principles inform the coexistence of private and
public rights on coastal properties, which lessens the need to discern the
particulars of specific deeds or account for variations in boundary drawing by
each state. Such a framework alerts property owners to the contingent and
variable nature of coastal property and allows the law to more nimbly adapt to
contemporary challenges, rather than remain ossified in a context that has long
since passed.
II. CONFLICTS ON THE SAND
A walk along a beach seems simple enough-and yet, if the walk is taken on
a beach to which another holds title, it may result in a lawsuit or criminal
prosecution for trespass.40 The United States Supreme Court decided over one

hundred years ago, and affirmed most recently in PPL Montana, LLC v.
Montana,41 that all states entered the union as sovereign owners of the beds of
tidal and navigable waters for the use and enjoyment of the public.42 Although a
variety of states recognize the public's right to walk and recreate along these
publicly held shores in the public/private beach zone,43 Some states exclude the
public from this zone.44 The issue remains vexed by uncertainty and
controversy. 45 At the root of the beach access issue are two competing values
deeply entrenched in American legal traditions since the American Revolution:
protections for private property and assertions of public trust interests in tidal
and navigable waters. 46

40. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Mich. 2005) (discussing a lawsuit for
trespass that arose from a walk along a shoreline).

41. 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
42. See id. at 1226, 1227, 1235 (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842))
(explaining the English common law origins that states, in their capacity as sovereigns, hold title to
the beds under navigable waters); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894) (stating that title and
control of lands under tide waters "are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people");
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891) (citing Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 57, 65-66, 69 (1873); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471, 477-78 (1850); Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230-31 (1845)) (explaining that title to the shore and lands under
water belongs to the state in trust for the public's navigation and fishery purposes).
43. See, e.g., Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 74 (finding that the public can walk "the lakeshore below
the ordinary high-water mark").
44. See, e.g., Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 277-78 (holding that the public could not use the
beach zone associated with privately owned property along tidal waters).
45. Compare Glass, 703 N.W. at 74 (recognizing the public's right to walk along public
shores), with Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 277-78 (excluding the public from the beach zone).
46. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 6-7 (citing Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris et
Brachiorum ejusdem, in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 84, 89
(Francis Hargrave ed., 1787)). Beach access controversies are often brought by diametrically
opposed advocates of these competing values, as exemplified by the Surfrider Foundation on the
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Accommodating even longstanding public and private property rights
becomes inherently difficult when they overlap or collide on the beach.47 As
shorelands shift because of natural processes and climate change, 48 as population
densities increase,49 and as more private developments spring up along ocean
coasts and lakeshores,so competition and conflicts over accessing the beach will
become more frequent.5 1 It is perhaps because of this scarcity and competition
that the public interest in beaches has become more pronounced.52

public trust side and the Pacific Legal Foundation on the private property side. Compare
SURFRIDER FOUNDATION, http://www.surfrider.org/programs/entry/beach-access (last visited Oct.
18, 2013) (promoting "low-impact, free and open [beach] access to ... all people"), with PACIFIC
LEGAL FOUNDATION, http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=640 (last visited Oct. 18, 2013)
(describing the Coastal Land Rights Project created on behalf of coastal property owners).
47. See, e.g., Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 70 (stating that public access and private rights to title in
beach property may overlap).
48.

Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Pointsfor

Climate Change Adaptation, 15 WIDENER L. REv. 521, 522-23 (2010) (citations omitted); Pagano,
supra note 18, at 6 (citing Megan Higgins, Legal and Policy Impacts of Sea Level Rise to Beaches
and Coastal Property, 1 SEA GRANT L. & POL'Y J., June 2008, at 49; Climate Impacts on Coastal
Areas, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/coasts.

html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013)).
49. In the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 2005 report on coastal
population trends in the United States from 1980 to 2008, the Administration described "the narrow
coastal fringe that makes up 17 percent of the nation's contiguous land area" as where more than
half of the population lives. KRISTEN M. CROSSETT ET AL., Coastal Trends Report Series:
Population Trends Along the Coastal United States: 1980-2008, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA) (2004), available at http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/

programs/mb/pdfs/coastalpop trends complete.pdf [hereinafter Coastal Trends Report].
According to the report, "In 2003, approximately 153 million people (53 percent of the nation's
population) lived in the 673 U.S. coastal counties, an increase of 33 million people since 1980."
Coastal Trends Report at 1. The updated population report also included the following findings:
*
By the year 2008, coastal county population is expected to increase by
approximately 7 million.
*
By the year 2008, the combined population increase of San Diego, San Bernardino,
Orange and Riverside counties in California will account for 12 percent of the total
U.S. coastal population increase.
*
Los Angeles County, CA, Harris County, TX, and Riverside County, CA
experienced the greatest increases in population from 1980 to 2003.
*
In 2003, 23 of the 25 most densely populated U.S. counties were coastal.
*
Almost one quarter of the nation's seasonal homes are found in the coastal areas of
Florida.
Coastal Trends Report Series: Population Trends Along the Coastal United States: 1980-2008,
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/

programs/mb/supp cstlpopulation.html (last updated Oct. 30, 2013).
50.

See CoastalTrend Reports, supra note 49, at 3.

51. See Pagano,supra note 18, at 7 ("The complexity of beaches gives rise to a complex set
of physical, social, and legal tensions.").
52. Robin Kundis Craig, Valuing Coastal and Ocean Ecosystem Services: The Paradox of
Scarcityfor Marine Resources Commodities and the Potential Role of Lifestyle Value Competition,
22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 355, 407 (2007) (discussing competition and scarcity in the

recognition and preservation of marine ecosystems and their associated services (quoting Jeffrey A.
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Two seminal beach access cases from the early 1970s arose from different
coasts, but expressed similar sentiments about the public value of beaches amidst
scarcity and competition in densely populated areas.53 In Borough of Neptune
54
City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, the New Jersey Supreme Courtcognizant of the scarcity of public beaches along the Atlantic Ocean-stated that
the "demands upon them by reason of increased population, industrial
development and their popularity for recreational uses and open space are much
heavier, and their importance to the public welfare has become much more
apparent."5 5 In Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court similarly
addressed competing uses of the coast along the Pacific Ocean, declaring that
"[t]his matter is of great public importance, particularly in view of population
pressures, demands for recreational property, and the increasing development of
seashore and waterfront property." 5 The concerns expressed by these justices
over forty years ago are even more pressing today. As of 2003, over half of the
U.S. population lived in coastal counties, and twenst -three of the twenty-five
most densely populated U.S. counties were coastal. These are "some of the
most developed areas in the nation." 59
Increased coastal population density has led to disputes regarding the
boundary between public trust and private property in a variety of circumstances
and jurisdictions. 60 When the law is uncertain or vague, violations of legal rights
can occur on either side: members of the public can trespass and diminish
valuable private property rights, 61 or private property owners can erect signs and
fences or hire private security guards that unreasonably exclude the public from
exercising rights to use beaches, thereby privatizing land that belongs to all.62

Krautkraemer, Economics of NaturalResource Scarcity: The State of the Debate 5 (Resources for
the Future, Discussion Paper 05-14, 2005))).
53. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378 (Cal. 1971) (discussing the public importance
of property issues "in view of population pressures, demands for recreational property, and the
increasing development of seashore and waterfront property"); Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 49-50, 53 (N.J. 1972), rev'd 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972)
(discussing the effects of scarcity and competition on the public's ability to use beaches).
54. 294 A.2d 47.
55. Id. at 53.
56. 491 P.2d 374.
57. See id. at 378 (expressing concerns about population density and development along
California's coasts in 1971).
58. Coastal Trends Reports, supranote 49, at 1.
59. Id. at 3.
60. See, e.g., Pagano, supra note 18, at 8-9 (explaining that beaches generate tensions
between the property rights of private landowners and the public when private landowners assert a
right to exclude).
61. See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 817 (Wis. 1914) (alleging that
trespass of private property injured the vegetation on the property, disturbed the plaintiffs use of
the property, and interfered with the plaintiffs exclusive hunting and shooting rights).
62. See, e.g., LT-WR, LLC v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 444 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (holding that the commission could not deny the permit for gates and no trespassing
signs due to the possibility of public prescriptive rights of access to the privately owned property);
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In the Great Lakes states, for instance, the public beach access issue is far
from settled.63 Only two of the eight Great Lakes states have published court
decisions concerning the public's right to walk on the public/private beach zone,
with diametrically opposed results.64 This leaves most of the Great Lakes
shoreline under a cloud of uncertainty regarding the expectations of private
property owners and the public.65 For instance, in the Wisconsin case of Doemel
v. Jantz,66 the court recognized an exclusive right of the private property owner
to use the beach that prohibits beach walking above the water line. In contrast,
Michigan's Supreme Court in Glass v. Goeckel68 resolved the beach walking
controversy in favor of the public's right to walk along the shores of the Great
Lakes in the public/private beach zone.69 To some, Glass v. Goeckel was an
"expansion" of public use rights along the Great Lakes shoreline and a
"redefinition" a of the scope of public trust property. 70 To others, the decision was
a predictable result of precedent, grounded in a public trust doctrine that has
been a critical component of state sovereignty since the founding of the United
States that is based on even earlier precedent from English and Roman law.n
With regard to ocean coastal areas, although public access to the
public/private beach zone-and even the dry uplands-is well-established in
many states,72 it is still in flux in others. 73

Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 124 (N.J. 2005) (holding that the
public trust doctrine applied to protect public use of the "upland sands" when a beach club
attempted to restrict the land to members only).
63. Kilbert, supra note 10, at 2 ("Courts have been inconsistent, in approach and result, when
determining the rights of the public to use the Great Lakes shores.").
64. Compare Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 75 (Mich. 2005) (recognizing the public's
right to walk along the beach shores in the public/private beach zone), with Doemel v. Jantz, 193
N.W. 393, 398 (Wis. 1923) (recognizing exclusive right of private property owner against beach
walkers above the water line).
65. See Kilbert, supra note 10, at 15 (stating that courts have reached "little consensus
regarding approach or result" in the cases deciding public rights along the Great Lakes' shores).
66. 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923).
67. See id. at 398. This case was wrongly decided, as a matter of law, as will be explained
below in Section V.
68. 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005).
69. Id. at 75.
70. Nathan Piwowarski, Comment, Trouble at the Water's Edge: Michigan Should Not
Extend the Public Trust Doctrine of the Great Lakes, as Reinterpreted in Glass v. Goeckel, to Its
Navigable Inland Rivers and Lakes or to Grant the PublicLateralAccess to Trust Properties,2006

MICH. ST. L. REv. 1045, 1047 (2006) (citing Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62).
71. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 868.
72. See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974)
(stating that, as a matter of custom, the public may use the "sandy area adjacent to mean high tide");
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (N.J. 2005) (holding that
the public trust doctrine allows public use of the upland sands); Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363, 365-66 (N.J. 1984) (finding that the public trust doctrine
justified the public's right to the public and private dry sand areas); State ex rel. Thorton v. Hay,
462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969) (stating that the custom of using "the dry sand as a public recreation
area is so notorious" that it should be presumed).
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As recently as 2011, the Maine Supreme Court was called upon to decide
whether the public has a right to simply walk across the public/private beach
zone to reach the ocean to scuba dive.74 Even forty years after New Jerse
famously struck down discriminatory residency requirements for beach access,
courts continue to review the legality of new schemes-like that attempted by a
local government in Connecticut-to keep certain groups of people off of the
beaches.76 Courts resolving beach access conflicts diverge in their results,
depending on the particular legal theories they apply. Before delving into the
legal theories at work, however, it is important to understand the historical
origins of the property at issue in the public/private beach zone, as well as the
scope of the public trust doctrine.
III. FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINES: PUBLIC TRUST AND EQUAL FOOTING
The public trust doctrine is the body of common, constitutional, and
statutory law that generally provides that the state shall hold and manage tidal
and navigable waters, along with the lands beneath them, in trust for the public. 77
The property protected by the public trust doctrine, as well as the scope of the
public rights that can be exercised on this propert , are key issues that define the
contours of public and private rights on beaches. Originally, courts interpreted
public trust rights as the rights to use trust waters for navigation, commerce, and
fishing.79 Some decisions include in these historical public rights the right of
"passage and repassage," interpreted today as the right to walk along the beach.80

73. See, e.g., Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 557-58, 565-66 (Conn. 2001)
(stating that the public may or may not have a right to use the beach property at issue and refusing
to resolve the public trust issues); Fabrikant v. Currituck Cnty., 621 S.E.2d 19, 22, 28 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-10.1 (2011)) (dismissing private property owners' action
to prevent the public from using the dry sand area because the plaintiffs failed to prove waiver of
sovereign immunity and failing to resolve the public trust issue).
74. McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 623 (Me. 2011).
75. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J.
1972).
76. See Leydon, 777 A.2d at 557-58 (discussing the legality of a town ordinance created to
restrict the use of a beachfront to residents and their guests).
77. See Frey & Mutz, supra note 25, at 918-19 (citations omitted).
78. See Craig, supra note 13, at 58 (proposing that states first determine the scope of the
public trust doctrine and then determine the uses protected by the public trust doctrine).
79. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894) (explaining that the primary use of
tidal lands is public in nature and for "highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign,
and for the purpose of fishing"); Diana Shooting Club v. Hunting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)
(determining that public navigable waters should be free to the public for commerce, travel,
recreation, hunting, and fishing).
80. See, e.g., Shively, 152 U.S. at 12 (recognizing that "the people have a public interest, ajus
publicum, of passage and repassage with their goods by water, and must not be obstructed by
nuisances" even on land privately held in fee (quoting Hale, supra note 46, at 36)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 74 (Mich. 2005) (stating that a "right
of passage over land below the ordinary high-water mark," which includes walking, is necessary to
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While some courts view public trust rights as fixed in those historically
recognized public uses, 81 other courts have developed the doctrine alongside the
public's changing uses of water to incorporate additional public purposes,
including traveling, bathing, recreating, hunting, protecting the ecosystem,
preserving scenic beauty, and maintaining access to the waters.82 For the past
ninety years, courts have been wrestling with the question of whether beach
access and walking along the shores of tidal and navigable waters are protected
as public trust rights.83
In the early seventeenth century, during the establishment of the original
American colonies, the public trust doctrine was an important principle of
English common law. 84 After the American Revolution, courts in the United
States referred to English common law as the "direct ancestor of, and thus the
presumptive authority and precedent for, application of the common law in the
United States."8 5 Thus, the public trust doctrine under English common law
established the foundation of the American doctrine.86
As for the original scope of property held in trust under English common
law, for all tidal waters, the "law recognized title in the crown up to the highwater mark ....
According to the Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby, the
King had "both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of
the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high-water
mark, within the jurisdiction of the Crown of England. .. ."89 The King held the

engage in other protected public rights of "fishing, hunting and navigation for commerce or
pleasure").
81. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974) (applying a fixed
theory of public rights to determine that the new right of passage on foot constituted an
unconstitutional taking).
82. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (describing public trust
easements as including fishing, hunting, bathing, swimming, boating, general recreation, scientific
study, and ecosystem protection); R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Wis.
2001) (noting that the public trust doctrine has been expansively interpreted to include uses such as
"boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, recreation, and to preserve scenic beauty").
83. See, e.g., LT-WR, LLC v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 444 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (discussing whether a possibility of prescriptive rights should preclude the granting of a
permit for gates and no trespassing signs on beach property); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama,
Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974) (allowing the public to use dry sand area for recreational
activities); Fabrikant v. Currituck Cnty., 621 S.E.2d 19, 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing
whether a county could be held liable for encouraging the public to use private beach property);
State ex rel Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969) (discussing whether the public has a
right to use the shore for recreation); Doemel v. Jantz, 180 193 N.W. 393, 394 (Wis. 1983)
(discussing whether "a member of the public can legally enter upon and use [the shore] for the
purposes of public travel").
84.

ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 5. Earlier Roman law, articulated in the Institutes of

Justinian, influenced English common law on this subject. Abrams, supra note 26, at 877.
85.
86.

ARCHERET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
Id.

87. Kilbert, supra note 10, at 22 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894)).
88. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
89. Id. at 11.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss2/2

14

Scanlan: Shifting Standards: A Meta-Theory for Public Access and Private P
2013]

PUBLIC ACCESS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY ALONG THE COAST

309

title absolutely, and in his role as sovereign, he held the public rights in trust for
the benefit of the public. 90 The origins for a sovereignty meta-theory of the
public trust may be found in early cases describing the role of the King of
England related to trust property.91
Such waters, and the lands which they cover ... are incapable of
ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and improvement; and their
natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of
navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of
fishing by all the King's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in
such lands ... belongs to the King as the sovereign; and the dominion
thereof,jus publicum, is vested in him as the representative of the nation
and for the public benefit.

That the people have a public interest, a jus publicum, of passage
and repassage with their goods by water, and must not be obstructed by
nuisances.
As successors in sovereignty to the English Crown, the original thirteen
states assumed ownership of all tidal waters and the beds beneath them. 93
According to the equal footing doctrine, when additional states joined the Union,
they did so on an equal footing with the original states and hence received "title
to the lands underlying navigable and tidal waters within its boundaries, absent a
clear pre-statehood grant or reservation by the federal government." 94 In Pollard
v. Hagan,95 the United States Supreme Court voided a patent issued by the
federal government to a private landowner for property below the ordinary highwater mark of a navigable river after Alabama became a state.96 The Court

90. Id.
91. See, e.g., id (describing the King of England as sovereign representative for the public
benefit).
92. Id. at 11, 12 (quoting Hale, supra note 46, at 36).
93. See id. at 14-15 (citations omitted); ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 3.
94. Kilbert, supra note 10, at 19. The equal footing doctrine is a constitutional doctrine
determined by federal law. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 9. The states' title to these lands
was "conferred not by Congress but by the Constitution itself." PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132
S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012) (quoting Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
96. Id. at 230. See generally Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 420 (1842) ("The
sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot ... make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the
state, divesting all the citizens of a common right."). According to one scholar:
In cases like Martin v. Waddell, the thrust of public trust as it both benefited and
burdened the later-formed states had become very clear-the foreshore was trust property
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voided the patent because the "shores of navigable waters, and the soils under
them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were
reserved to the states respectively." 97 The states hold these lands and waters in
trust for the benefit of all citizens.98
At the end of the 1800s, the United States Supreme Court had several
occasions to elaborate on the equal footing doctrine and the transfer of waterrelated property from the federal government to the states upon their entrance
into the Union. 99 In its 1876 decision in Barney v. Keokuk,100 the Court
explained the American departure from the English rule limiting Crown
ownership to the beds under tidal waters. 101 In the United States, settled law
recognizes that the states obtained the lands under navigable freshwater lakes
and rivers, as well as lands under tidal waters, when they entered into the
Union-subject only to the federal navigation servitude and commerce power of
Congress. 10 The Court famously described this initial federal grant of navigable
waters and the lands beneath them in Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois in

1892,103 and then again in Shively v. Bowlby in 1894.104
In Illinois Central, the Court ultimately upheld the Illinois legislature's
rescission of a grant to a railroad corporation of the bed of Lake Michigan in the
Chicago Harbor because such a grant would be void under the public trust

in the hands of the United States, so the national government was not competent to impair
the trust and all states succeeded to the interest of the previous foreign sovereign.
Abrams, supra note 26, at 892.
97. Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230.
98. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) ("[T]he State holds the title to
the lands under the navigable waters . . . .").
99. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 387; Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
100. 94 U.S. at 324.
101. Id. at 337-38 (citing Propeller Genesee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851);
Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. 471 (1850); Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) 212; Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367).
102. See l. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435 (citing Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 57 (1873); Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) 212).
103. Id. (citing Weber, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57; Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) 212). The public
trust and equal footing doctrines are legally distinct. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct.
1215, 1234-35 (2012). On the one hand, "[t]he equal footing doctrine provides that each new state
that enters the Union receives title to the lands underlying navigable and tidal waters within its
boundaries, absent a clear pre-statehood grant or reservation by the federal government." Kilbert,
supra note 10, at 19; see also PPL Mont., LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1227-28 (quoting United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1934)). The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, is the body of law that
describes how these waters and lands must be managed in trust for the public. Kilbert, supra note
10, at 17.
104. Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58. Additional U.S. Supreme Court cases similarly explained
these settled principles regarding state ownership of tidelands in particular. Borax Consol., Ltd. v.
Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935) (citations omitted); Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873) (citing Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423 (1867);
Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) 212); Goodtitle, 50 U.S. at 477-78; Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230;
Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss2/2

16

Scanlan: Shifting Standards: A Meta-Theory for Public Access and Private P
2013]

PUBLIC ACCESS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY ALONG THE COAST

311

doctrine.105 In reaching its holding, the Court clarified that all navigable waters
and the lands underneath them-which had been in the public domain prior to
the formation of states-were vested in each new state when it entered the Union
to be used for public purposes.106 Indeed, the Court articulated a uniform
doctrine based on the notion that states entered the Union on equal footing:
There can be no distinction between the several States of the Union in
the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they
may possess and exercise over persons and subjects within their
respective limits. The boundaries of the state were prescribed by
congress and accepted by the state in its original Constitution.107
Two years later, in Shively v. Bowlby, the United States Supreme Court built
on the Illinois Central foundation and identified the boundary of the original
grant from the federal government to the states as covering "soil below [the]
high-water mark .
8.. This demarcation line is consistent with English
common law, under which the King's trust holdings went up to the high-water
mark on the shore. 109 Thus, when the federal government granted navigable and
tidal waters to the states as they entered the Union, it did so up to the ordinary
high-water mark. 110

105. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 460 (holding an attempted conveyance of a lakebed
inoperative).
106. Id. at 434-35.
107. Id. at 434.
108. Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58; see also Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891) (stating
that governmental rights extend up to the high-water mark). However, the Court also explained that
riparian and littoral private property rights are governed by state law. Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58.
Consistent with this demarcation line at the ordinary high-water mark, the federal navigation
servitude along rivers and streams also extends to the same mark. United States v. Chi.,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 596-97 (1941) (citations omitted) (holding that the
navigation servitude extends up to the ordinary high-water mark on a navigable stream).
109. Kilbert, supra note 10, at 22 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 26, 51, 57-58).
110. Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58; see also Hardin, 140 U.S. at 381 (stating that governmental
rights extend up to the high-water mark); Kilbert, supra note 10, at 22 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at
26, 51, 57-58) (stating that common law provided the government property rights up to the highwater mark). For oceans, the high-water mark may be called the mean high tide line, which is
defined as "the average height of all the high waters" over the lunar cycle of 18.6 years that governs
the tides. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935) (quoting MARMUR,
TIDAL DATUM PLANES 76, SPECIAL PUBLICATION No. 135, U.S. COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY

(1927)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This line can change significantly over the years. See
id. For inland lakes, water levels fluctuate based on forces that lack the regularity of lunar tides,
such as precipitation and barometric pressure:
This fluctuation results in temporary exposure of land that may then remain exposed
above where water currently lies. This land, although not immediately and presently
submerged, falls within the ambit of the public trust because the lake has not permanently
receded from that point and may yet again exert its influence up to that point.
Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 71 (Mich. 2005). The physical location of the ordinary highwater mark on lakes is often a discernible line landward of the point at which the water is in contact
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Since Shively v. Bowlby and Illinois Central, the United States Supreme

Court has been relatively silent on the equal footing doctrine. However, the
Court more recently reaffirmed in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. MississippiI" in

1988 and PPL Montana, LLC112 in 2012 that, under the equal footing doctrine,
the federal government transferred ownership to the states over all lands subject
to tidal influence, regardless of navigability, 13 as well as all lands under rivers
that were navigable in fact at the time of statehood.114 These decisions
underscore the quality distinguishing the equal footing doctrine from the public
trust doctrine.
The equal footing doctrine, defined by federal law, describes
the original grant of water-related property to the states as determined at the time
of statehood; these waters are referred to as navigable for title purposes.116
Hence, the original demarcation line for trust lands and waters is the same for all
states-consistent with the equal footing doctrine-and is set at the ordinary
high-water mark pursuant to federal law. 7 In contrast, the public trust doctrine,

with the shore. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914) (citing Town of
Lawrence v. Am. Writing Paper Co., 128 N.W. 440, 442 (Wis. 1910)). Some courts describe the
ordinary high-water mark as the line where "the presence and action of the water is so continuous as
to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily
recognized characteristic." Id. (citing Town of Lawrence, 128 N.W. at 442); see also Glass, 703
N.W.2d at 72-73 (quoting DianaShooting Club, 145 N.W. at 820) (adopting Wisconsin's definition
of ordinary high-water mark); State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Wis. 1987) (citing Town of
Lawrence, 128 N.W. at 442).
111. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
112. 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
113. See PPL Mont., LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1227 (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,
410 (1842)); Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 476 (citing McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391,
395-97 (1876)). In Phillips Petroleum Co., private property owners claimed title to lands
underlying non-navigable waters influenced by the tide, which they traced back to a pre-statehood
Spanish land grant. 484 U.S. at 472. The State of Mississippi claimed title to the same land based
on the original grant of land underlying tidal waters when Mississippi entered the Union on equal
footing with the other states. Id. The private property owners argued that they had record title for
these lands and had paid taxes on them for more than a century. Id. at 481-82. The Court stated
that it honors "reasonable expectations in property interests," but found these expectations were not
reasonable given that Mississippi courts have consistently held that the state has title to all public
trust lands, including all the land under the tidewater. Id. at 482 (citing Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs,
146 So. 291, 291-92 (Miss. 1933)).
114. PPL Mont., LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1227-28. Rivers "are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
115. See PPL Mont., LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1227-28; Phillips Petroleum, Co., 484 U.S. at 476

(citing McCready, 94 U.S. at 395-97).
116. PPL Mont., LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1227 (citing Martin, 41 U.S. at 410).
117. See Kilbert, supra note 10, at 19-24 (citations omitted). This is also called the mean high
tide. See Kilbert, supra note 10, at 23 (citing Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 2627 (1935)).
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as well as property law more generally, is defined by state law.118 Today, most
states recognize public trust rights in the public/private beach zone, but vary as
to the scope of those rights and the meaning of private titles showing private
property lines below the ordinary high-water mark. 19
States have the power to expand the resources and rights protected by the
public trust doctrine. 120 However, state power to contract and relinquish
ownershiv of property the federal government transferred at statehood is
limited,
and courts diverge on the nature and extent of that limitation.122
Therein lies the root of why some states allow the public to access the
public/private beach zone for walking and general recreation, while other states
protect the exclusive use of this zone by private property owners.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY META-THEORY, PROPERTY, AND PUBLIC RIGHTS

With regard to the question of locating the line where the coastal private fee
title ends, states are divided.123 Most states fall into the mean or ordinary highwater mark group 124 -consistent with the original federal grant of property to the
states125-while a minority fall into the mean or ordinary low-water mark
group.126 In this Article, these states will be referred to as "high-water" or "lowwater states." High-water states fix the boundary at the mean or ordinary highwater mark: private property in the uplands ends at the ordinary high-water

118. See PPL Mont., LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1235; Elizabeth B. Wydra, ConstitutionalProblems
with Judicial Takings Doctrine and the Supreme Court's Decision in Stop the Beach

Renourishment, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 109, 120 (2011).
119. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15-16 & n.1.

120. PPL Mont., LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1235 ("Under accepted principles of federalism, the States
retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders,
while federal law determines riverbed title under the equal-footing doctrine.").
121. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (stating that state
control over tidewaters is subject to limitations that Congress may impose).
122. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 58.

123. West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d 601, 617 (N.C. 1985).
124. See, e.g., Bloom v. Water Res. Comm'n, 254 A.2d 884, 887 (Conn. 1969) ("The state, as
the representative of the public, is the owner of the soil between high-and [sic] low-water mark
upon navigable water where the tide ebbs and flows."); Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Indus. Park, 276
A.2d 61, 64 (Md. 1971) (stating that private landowners bordering tidal waters own to the mean
high-water mark); Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 608 (N.H. 1994) (noting New Hampshire
has rejected the "Massachusetts law that adopted the low-water mark as the boundary between
public and private ownership" (citing Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 730-31 (N.H.
1890))); West, 326 S.E.2d at 617 ("In North Carolina private property fronting coastal water ends at
the high-water mark and the property lying between the high-water mark and the low-water mark
known as the 'foreshore' is the property of the State.").
125. See Kilbert, supra note 10, at 19.
126. See, e.g., McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 626 (Me. 2011) (naming Maine,
Massachusetts, and Virginia as states that extend private property rights to the low-water mark and
explaining how ownership to the low-water mark originated in the colonial grant of property from
England, which diverged from the seventeenth century English common law of private ownership
ending at the high-tide line).
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mark, while the state holds the property below that mark into the sea or lake.127
Low-water states, as the term indicates, fix the private property boundary at the
mean or ordina2 low-water mark: private property in the uplands ends at the
low-water mark.
Yet, even in the low-water states, the existence of private property to the
low-water boundary alone does not determine the shared/exclusive nature of the
property between the high- and low-water marks or the scope of public rights in
that public/private beach zone. 12 9 More surprising, perhaps, is that even in highwater states, there may be deeds that grant title to an individual private property
owner down to the low-water mark or beyond.130 Thus, while all states have
relatively clear rules regarding the dividing line between state and private title on
the shore,131 the particular legal theory undergirding their courts' decisions is far
more important in determining the contours of public and private rights.132
A fundamental difference between the beach access cases is whether courts
view the dividing line for title purposes as the boundary for all public rights or
whether courts recognize a public trust easement overlapping the private title. 133
The meta-theory driving a court's decision to use a lineal title or an easement
approach focuses on whether the public trust doctrine is considered an attribute
of state sovereignty.134 If so, the court will conclude that it is beyond the power
of the state to redefine public trust property as private property and eliminate
public rights.135 In other words, even if the state redrew the private property
boundary at the low-water mark and was silent about the impact on public trust
rights, a public trust easement must continue to exist up to the ordinary highwater mark because the state lacks the power to extinguish it. 13 6
Secondly, after determining whether the lineal title or the easement approach
applies to the public/private beach property, the court will define the scope of
public rights on the property.137 Whether a court views public rights as fixed or
evolving influences the nature and category of rights protected in the
public/private beach zone.

127. See West, 326 S.E.2d at 617.
128. See id.

129. See, e.g., State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 621 (Minn. 1914) (private property on lakes
extends to the low-water mark, subject to public rights up to the high-water mark).
130. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378-79 & n.5 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted)
(defining tidelands as the land extending up to the mean high tide and explaining that California
holds the tidelands in trust, but still recognizing private patents to some tidelands to the low tide).
131. See supra notes 124, 126 and accompanying text.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.

136. See Rose, supra note 26, at 728.
137. See Kilbert, supra note 10, at 58.
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Sovereignty Theory and Implications for the Choice of Public Trust
Easement or Lineal Title

The extent to which the public trust doctrine protects public uses of the
beach up to the ordinary high-water mark depends on whether courts are
persuaded by an overarching sovereignty meta-theory: the public trust doctrine is
an attribute of state sovereignty, and as such, the state lacks the power to
eliminate it.138 According to this theory, it is "beyond the power of the state" to
completely abdicate trust responsibility over lands and waters the federal
government originally transferred at statehood to be held in trust. 139
Given the strong protections for exclusive use of private property in the
United States, Professor Carol Rose highlighted this anomalous approach to
public trust property, stating that "[m]ost property is not impressed with a
'public trust' allowing access; why should the beaches be?" 140 Drawing on the
definitional-historical approach to understanding property taken by the Supreme
Court in Phillips Petroleum and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,141

courts motivated by a sovereignty theory view public access as inherent in the
title to the public/private beach zone, even when the terms of the deed are silent
about the existence of an easement.142 In takings terms-as will be discussed
below-this forms the foundation of background principles necessary to
understanding property rights.143 Some courts have concluded that states cannot

138. See Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (Wis. 1914) (declaring it
"beyond the power of the state to alienate [the river bed] freed from such [public trust] rights"
(citing People v. N.Y. & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877); Priewe v. Wis. State Land
& Improvement Co., 79 N.W. 780, 782 (Wis. 1899); 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36a, at 173 (1904))).
139. Diana Shooting Club, 145 N.W. at 819 (citing N.Y & Staten IslandFerry Co., 68 N.Y. at
76; Priewe, 79 N.W. at 782; FARNHAM, supra note 138, at 173); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v.

Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 434 (1892) (asserting that the use of lands covered by tidal waters cannot
impair the public interest in the property and is subject to Congressional control); Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 215-16 (1845) (declaring that rivers may not be sold, and the "right to them
passes with a transfer of sovereignty" (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413
(1842))). Additionally, based on the public trust doctrine and the gift clause of the Arizona
constitution, the Arizona courts have rejected two legislative attempts to avoid state title to
streambeds by defining these water bodies as non-navigable. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18
P.3d 722, 728-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v.
Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166-73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). Professor Abrams is a
leading scholar who advances the concept of the public trust doctrine as a limitation on sovereignty.
See Abrams, supra note 26, at 903-04 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 448).
140. Rose, supra note 26, at 716.
141. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
142. Id. at 1027; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988) (citing
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395-97 (1877)). Academics have explored this definitionalhistorical approach in contrast to an approach focused on terms of deeds and expectations. See
Joseph L. Sax, Rights That "Inhere in the Title Itself": The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western
Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 944 (1993) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29).
143. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 73-74.
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take what they already own and never had the power to diminish.144 Consistent
with this concept, Professor Rose described public trusts as being "in the nature
of an inalienable easement, assuring public access." 145
In support of this unique approach to public trust property, Professor
Abrams provided rich and layered historical precedent for an easement approach
based on a sovereignty theory.146 He demonstrated that, although quite different
from the protections afforded other property in the United States, the existence
of overlapping public and private rights is grounded in many centuries of
precedent in English common law. 147
English law drew heavily on an even earlier legal framework that existed
under Roman law.148 For the Romans, private title in the shore area did not
exist:
To what extent were the public rights to the foreshore among those
things that were inalienable? Under Roman law, this was not an open
question because the great waters and the lands below the highest tide
were not only publicly owned, but they were considered in the class of
things incapable of private ownership. 9
England continued to use a similar property construction, but it substituted
the King as the steward of resources for the Roman concept of the laws of
nature.
However, unlike Roman natural law, vesting title in the Crown did not
mean that the foreshore area was incapable of private ownership; rather, it meant
that private title was severed from and needed to coexist along with public
rights.15 1 The English common law concepts of jus privatum andjus publicum
encapsulate the inalienable public easement with overlapping public and private
rights. 152 Jus privatum is the legal title to the land that the Crown may transfer
to a private owner. 153 Jus publicum, however, is the sovereign's duty to hold
property in trust for the public benefit.154 Out of these English common law
descriptions, a sovereignty theory developed that led to the conclusion that the
King could not convey the public trust easement or jus publicum155 : "Although

144. See id. at 78-80 (citations omitted).
145. Rose, supra note 26, at 728.
146. Abrams, supra note 26, at 869-89 (citations omitted).
147. See id. at 877-93 (citations omitted).
148. See id. at 877-83 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 880.
150. Id. at 877-81 (citations omitted).
151. See id. at 881 (citing Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the
Public Trust: The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673,
679(2005)).
152. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 103 (Mich. 2005) (citing Lorman v. Benson, 8
Mich. 18, 28 (1860)).
153. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 6-7 (citing Hale, supra note 46, at 89).
154. Id. at 7 (citing Hale, supra note 46, at 89).
155. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (citations omitted).
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the [K]ing could convey the lands below the high-water mark, any conveyance
to a private individual was subject to the jus publicum.... The jus publicum
included uses 'for highways of navigation and commerce,15domestic
and foreign,
6
and for the purpose of fishing by all the King's subjects."'
Under English common law, the dividing line for private title was not the
same as the line for public rights.157 Put another way, the holder of the jus
privatum (title) in the public/private beach zone could not "impede the public's
customary use of public trust land. ... ."
During the early development of the public trust doctrine in the United
States, this sovereignty theory permeated some of the landmark Supreme Court
cases.159 For instance, in Pollardv. Hagan,160 the Supreme Court described the
"right to the shore between high and low water-mark" as "an attribute of
sovereignty."161

The Court declared that "[r]ivers must be kept open; they are

not land, which may be sold, and the right to them passes with a transfer of
sovereignty [from the United States to the states]."162
Similarly, in Illinois Central, the Court explained that ownership of the
navigable waters and lakebeds is a "subject of public concern to the whole

people of the State." 163 The Court also reasoned that "[t]he sovereign power,
itself, therefore, cannot ... make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the
State, divesting all the citizens of their common right."
Thus, according to a

sovereignty theory, if after being admitted into the Union, a state chooses to
transfer to private owners the title to the public/private beach zone between the
ordinary high- and low-water marks, those lands are still burdened with a public

156. Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 607-08 (N.H. 1994) (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at
11, 13). According to Kilbert:
Both private, jus privatum, and public, jus publicum, interests were recognized in
the lands underlying navigable waters. While legal title to the lands under navigable
waters (fus privatum) could be transferred by the crown to a private party, the crown
would continue to hold the public's interest in using the lands (jus publicum) in trust for
the people.
Kilbert, supra note 10, at 4.
157. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 6-7.

158. Id. at 7; see also Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 (Cal.1971) (quoting People v. Cal.
Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 87 (Cal. 1913)) (preserving the public interest in the tideland and stating that
the private property owner of tidelands cannot divest the public of its right to use the land for
navigation).
159. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (noting that the sovereignty
theory of land covered by tidewaters has been established and frequently discussed by the Supreme
Court); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (discussing sovereignty in relation to the
passing of tideland property).
160. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212.
161. Id. at 215-16.
162. Id. at 216 (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413 (1842)).
163 11. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 455.
164. Id. at 456 (quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (N.J. 1821)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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trust easement.165 A state's power to redefine property does not include the
power to extinguish the public trust easement on public trust property it grants to
private owners. 166
English common law informed the holding in Illinois Central. The Court
recognized that, while the King could grant the soil under tidal waters to a
private party under English common law, the grant was "subject to the
paramount right of public use of navigable waters, which he could neither
destroy nor abridge." 68 The Court quoted Lord Hale to underscore the idea that
"[t]he jus privatum that is acquired by the subject, either by patent or
prescription, must not prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers and
the arms of the sea are affected to public use." 169
While the Illinois Central Court ultimately held that a grant of Lake
Michigan's lakebed beneath most of the Chicago Harbor to a private entity
would be void or subject to revocation,170 it also described the situations in
which such a grant of title to a private party would be consistent with the public
trust doctrine.
That explanation accords with finding an easement in the
public/private beach zone. Such an approach does not outright prohibit all
private ownership in this area, but it does maintain public rights if the property's
title is conveyed into private ownership. The Supreme Court limited the
situations in which a state may make valid grants of trust property to when
parcels "are used in promoting the interests of the public" or "can be disposed of
without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining. ,,172
According to Professor Robert Abrams, the holding in Illinois Central
"clearly announced the burden on states: the foreshore was trust property, not
only while it was in the hands of the federal government in the pre-statehood

165. See id. States may alienate trust lands below the ordinary high-water mark, but such
grants cannot interfere with the superior rights of public use and navigation. See Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894) (permitting small grants). In Shively, the Court did not need to
address whether a state must maintain public rights on trust lands conveyed or granted to private
owners because the Oregon law that allowed for the sale of tidelands down to the low-water mark
expressly stated that the grant was subject to the public easement. See id. at 6 n.1 (citing 1874 OR.
LAWS 76; 1872 OR. LAWS 129).
166. See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (Wis. 1914) (declaring it
"beyond the power of the state to alienate [the river bed] freed from such [public trust] rights . . . ."
(citing People v. N.Y. & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 73-74 (1877); Priewe v. Wis. State
Land & Improvement Co., 79 N.W. 780, 782 (Wis. 1899); FARNHAM, supranote 138, at 172)).
167. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 436 (discussing English common law and its
relevancy to the case at hand).
168. Id. at 458 (emphasis added) (quoting N. Y & Staten IslandFerry Co., 68 N.Y. at 76).
169. Id. at 458 (quoting Hale, supra note 46, at 22) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id. at 460.
171. See id. at 452-53. The U.S. Supreme Court described the trust as essentially prohibiting
a state from abdicating its general control over lands under navigable waters. See id.
172. Id. at 423.
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period, but also when it was in the hands of the states after statehood."173 He
argues that public trust rights along the United States' "great waters, including
the Great Lakes, derive from the very essence of sovereignty as it is embedded in
the American system of government." 174 In other words, although a state may
convey title under limited circumstances, it cannot legislatively remove the
public trust easement from the public/private beach zone;175 such an action is
either void or voidable according to Illinois Central.176
Similarly, state courts that view the public trust doctrine as inherent in state
sovereignty divide property into public and private property-or jus publicum
and jus privatum estates-in effect, differentiating lines for title purposes from
This approach accommodates the coexistence of public and
rights to use.
private rights in the same property along the shoreline-much as easement law
accommodates differences between ownership rights and use rights.1
For instance, the California Supreme Court's decision in Marks v.
Whitneyl79 typifies a sovereignty theory and easement construct. so In that case,
the court rejected an attempt by a landowner to fill tidelands, based on an
understanding that the beach property was a divided estate on which the private
1
8.
title was burdened by public rights that "restrained private development ..
Marks v. Whitney is an excellent example of how an easement approach allows a
court to simultaneously recognize the state's sovereign ownership of tidelands up
to the mean high-tide line and not disturb individual patents that grant private
ownership in land to the mean low-tide line.182 Accounting for the sale of
tidelands to private owners, the court asserted that the "only practicable theory"
was to recognize that the sale of these lands did not divest the public of their
rights.183 In this way, an easement approach accommodates multiple interests

173. Abrams, supra note 26, at 892 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 436-37). The
foreshore is "[t]hat part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by
the ordinary flow of the tides; i. e., [sic] by the medium line between the greatest and least range of
tide, (spring tides and neap tides)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 511 (2d ed. 1910). This Article

refers to the foreshore as the public/private beach zone.
174. Abrams, supra note 26, at 861.
175. See id.
176. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453.
177. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 (Cal. 1971) (quoting People v. Cal. Fish Co.,
138 P. 79, 87 (Cal. 1913)).
178. See id. (quoting Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. at 87).
179. 491 P.2d at 374.
180. See id. at 378 n.1, 379 n.5 (citing Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 15-16
(1935)).
181. Blumm, supra note 26, at 658-59 (citing Marks, 491 P.2d at 381).
182. Marks, 491 P.2d at 378-79, 379 n.5, 381 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 379 (quoting Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. at 87). Despite the California Supreme Court's
recognition ofjuspublicum on privately held tidelands, its opinion left the door open for the state to
remove the public trust easement. See id. at 380 (quoting City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d
423, 437 (Cal. 1970)). For instance, the court opined that the legislature could convey tidelands into
private absolute ownership freed of the public trust if the legislature finds the lands were "no longer
useful for trust purposes" and "not subject to the constitutional prohibition forbidding
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and harmonizes otherwise discordant laws.184 Drawing upon English common
law, the California Supreme Court restated:
Our opinion is that the buyer of land under these statutes receives the
title to the soil, the jus privatum, subject to the public right of
navigation, and in subordination to the right of the state to take
possession and use and improve it for that purpose, as it may deem
necessary. In this way the public right will be preserved, and the private
right of the urchaser will be given as full effect as the public interests
will permit.

Another example of a state court employing the sovereignty theory comes
from Wisconsin.
When Wisconsin entered the Union on equal footing with
the original states and obtained title to all navigable waters, as well as the lands
beneath them, it incorporated the language of the Northwest Ordinance into the
state constitution as follows 187 : "[T]he navigable waters leading into the
Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be
common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the state, as to
the citizens of the United States, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor."188
Following Illinois Central and Shively,189 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
interpreted this provision to form the foundation of the public trust doctrine,
which it applied to the original federal grant of trust property to the state.190 The
court also articulated this doctrine as a limitation on state sovereignty: the state
holds title to navigable waters and the lands beneath them "solely for ... trust
purposes, and ... any conveyance in violation of such trust is necessarily
void." 191

alienation ..... Id. (quoting Mansell, 476 P.2d at 437). The court described such a decision as a
"political question" for the legislature. Id. at 381.
184. See id. at 379 (quoting Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. at 87).
185. Id. (quoting Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. at 87) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. See, e.g., Ill. Steel Co. v. Bilot, 84 N.W. 855, 856 (Wis. 1901) (applying the sovereignty
theory).
187. See Lundberg v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 282 N.W. 70, 73 (Wis. 1938).
188. WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2002).
189. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892).
190. See Bilot, 84 N.W. at 856-57.
191. Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 395 (Wis. 1923) (citations omitted) (discussing the
holding in Bilot, 84 N.W. at 855, in support of the argument that the United States never had title of
the lakebeds, except for the purpose of holding them in trust for the public). Similarly, the
Michigan Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he state, as sovereign, cannot relinquish this duty to
preserve public rights in the Great Lakes and their natural resources." Glass v. Goeckel, 703
N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005). Additionally, the Great Lakes and the lands beneath them remain
subject to the federal navigational servitude, which preserves federal government control "for the
purpose of regulating and improving navigation ..... Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 27172 (1897) (citing Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1896); Shively, 152 U.S. 1, 34;
South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 10 (1876)).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court's seminal public trust case, Diana Shooting
Club v. Husting,192 illustrates how a sovereignty theory allows courts to
reconcile the concept of maintaining the public trust doctrine with a state's
power to define property rights.193 In DianaShooting Club, the court explained
that although Wisconsin decided to divest its ownership of the beds of navigable
rivers and allow private ownership, public rights must limit that private title.194
According to the court, "As long as the state secures to the people all the rights
they would be entitled to if it owned the beds of navigable rivers, it fulfills the
trust imposed upon it by the organic law, which declares that all navigable
waters shall be forever free."195
With regard to public trust rights, the court stated that "it is entirely
immaterial who holds the title, the state or the riparian owners.

. .

. It is beyond

the power of the state to alienate [beds underlying navigable waters] freed from
such rights."1 96 Thus, the DianaShooting Club court viewed public trust rights
as a kind of easement that burdened the private estate and could never be
eliminated.197 This easement prevented the state from conveying the typical
ownership right to exclude, along with the private title to the riverbed.198
Ultimately, the court rejected the trespassing claim before it and held that the
public maintained a public trust right to hunt on the riverbed up to the ordinary
high-water mark-despite the private ownership of the riverbed. 99
Moreover, the coexistence of public and private rights on the same property
accommodates the various rights at issue in contemporary beach access
controversies. 200 A court can recognize overlapping rights in this area: the

192. 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914).
193. See id. at 819.
194. Id
195. Id
196. Id. (citing People v. N.Y. & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877); Priewe v.
Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 79 N.W. 780, 782 (Wis. 1899); FARNHAM, supra note 138, at
173). The limited power of the state to alienate waters freed of the trust stands in contrast to the
power of the state to dispose of other lands the federal government granted to it at the time of
statehood. See id. (citing N.Y & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. at 76; Priewe, 79 N.W. at 782;
FARNHAM, supra note 138, at 173); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY INWISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 22 (1984). The federal

government granted to Wisconsin 10,200,000 acres, which is about 29% of the whole area of
Wisconsin. HURST, supra at 10. The State of Wisconsin was to hold these public lands in a trust
capacity to be used for purposes delineated by Congress, such as establishing schools, reclaiming
swamplands, or building canals and railroads. Id. at 17. State sale of these lands in violation of
congressional purposes, however, did not result in automatic reversion of the title back to the United
States; rather, the sale required Congress to take legal action to assert a violation, which it never did.
Id at 628 n.7.
197. See DianaShooting Club, 145 N.W. at 819.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 820.
200. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984)
(holding that "the public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as
reasonably necessary").
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private landowner's jus privatum may include rights such as possession and
alienation, while the public's jus publicum still burdens the beachfront estate and
allows for public access.201 In reviewing the beach access cases that follow, a
primary difference emerges between courts that limit the public trust doctrine to
lands the state owns and courts that recognize that the us publicum/privatum
distinction provides an inalienable public trust easement.2
When courts understand the public trust as an easement on the public/private
beach zone, the boundary of private title may not be the same as the boundary
for public trust rights.203 For instance, a state may redefine the original grant of
trust property and draw the private title line at the low-water mark, rather than
the ordinary high-water mark.204 Nonetheless, a public trust easement continues
to protect public rights to the high-water mark.205 Thus, the public trust
easement on the private fees protects public usufructuary rights just like riparian
or littoral rights extend private rights into public waters. 206 Under an easement
approach, private property holders have more limited rights to exclude the public
from exercising public trust uses on the property. 207
In contrast to the sovereignty theory that leads to an easement approach, a
competing theory is that the state has ultimate control to define (i.e., shrink) the
scope of trust property, subject only to the Federal Government's constitutional
right to control commerce and navigation.209 Support for that theory is found in
the fact that some states have conveyed trust property to private owners
effectively free of public rights.210

201. See Blumm, supra note 26, at 658-59 (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 381
(Cal. 1971)).
202. Compare McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 628 (Me. 2011) (recognizing an
inalienable public trust easement), with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476
(1988) (opining that states hold title to all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide).
203. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.
204. See, e.g., McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 626 (noting that Maine, Massachusetts, and Virginia are
all low-water mark states).
205. See Blumm, supra note 26, at 659 (citing Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich.
2005)).
206. See McGarvey, 28 A.2d at 627.

207. See Blumm, supranote 26, at 665.
208. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
209. See generally Genevieve Pisarski, Testing the Limits of the Federal Navigational
Servitude, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 313, 313-14 (1997) (citations omitted) (discussing how the

United States has authority, through the Commerce Clause, over control and improvement of
navigation-including the ability to use land within the boundaries of navigable waters for purposes
related to navigation and commerce-regardless of ownership and without compensation).
210. State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 948 (Ohio 2011)
(quoting Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass. 1961); State
ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 725 (Ohio 1948)).
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The Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue, but it has
muddied the waters in dicta.211 Although the holding in Phillips Petroleum
arguably focused on an expansion of public trust property, the Court
acknowledged, in defense of its holding, that some states have reduced trust
property.
In PhillipsPetroleum, the Court endorsed Mississippi's assertion of
public trust ownership of non-navigable tidal waters and the lands beneath them,
despite the terms of the title and the expectations Phillips developed by holding
title and paying taxes over the course of a century.213 In response to arguments
that the Court's decision to recognize Mississippi's ownership of non-navigable
tidal waters would upset property ownership in other coastal states, 214 the Court
countered that some states had already "granted all or a portion of their tidelands
to adjacent upland property owners long ago. Our decision today does nothing
to change ownership rights in States which previously relinquished a public trust
claim to tidelands such as those at issue here." 215
The Court went on to state that, "even where States have given dominion
over tidelands to private property owners, some States have retained for the
general public the right to fish, hunt, or bathe on these lands."2 16 The Supreme
Court's discussion in Phillips Petroleum indicates that states may, but not
necessarily must, retain a public trust easement on those trust lands.217
Professor Kenneth Kilbert offered a finer point on the debate.
He
described the original federal grant as only the "starting point" for the
demarcation line between public and private, suggesting that states are able to
change the boundaries of private title to extend below the high-water mark
within certain limited circumstances.219 He argued-consistently with Shively
and Phillips Petroleum-that the states "have some authority to redefine the
geographic scope of the lands held in public trust," but that authority is neither
boundless nor ossified in the original purposes of the public trust doctrine.220 He
asserted-consistently with Illinois Central-that a state can only contract the

211. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483 (1988) (stating in dicta
that some states have "relinquished a public trust claim to tidelands").
212. Id.
213. See Sax, supra note 142, at 949-50 (citing Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472, 481-82,
484; id at 492 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
214. PhillipsPetroleum, 484 U.S. at 482-83.
215. Id. at 483.
216. Id. at 483-84.
217. See id. at 483.
218. See Kilbert, supra note 10.
219. See id. at 58.
220. Id. at 33 (citing Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK (2d ed. 1997)).

Shively involved a state law that allowed

private conveyance below the ordinary high-water mark, but subject to the "paramount right of
navigation inherent in the public." Shively, 152 U.S. at 52 (citations omitted). However, the Shively
decision did not involve the issue of whether a state can extinguish the public trust easement when it
conveys trust lands into private ownership.
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scope of lands protected by the public trust doctrine when (1) "the legislature's
intent to do so is clear," (2) "the public's rights to engage in uses protected by
the public trust doctrine are not substantially impaired," and (3) "where an
important public interest is promoted." 22 1
Courts that reject a sovereignty theory in favor of a more absolute state
power to define property rights tend to focus on a lineal title interpretation of the
property boundaries.
Under a lineal title approach, the dividing line for title
purposes is exactly the same as the dividing line for public rights. 22 3 Courts
adopting this approach view the public trust doctrine as rooted in ownership and
divide coastal property into public and private fee simples.224 Thus, under the
lineal title approach, no public rights exist on the private property side of the
line.225
Courts that follow a lineal title approach draw a bright line between private
and public property-both for title and for use rights.226 However, this approach
is a double-edged sword that can also limit private rights. 227 For instance, the
New Jersey Supreme Court followed a lineal title approach in Arnold v. Mundy,
denying private rights to harvest oysters.228 According to Professor Michael
Blumm, that approach led the court to conclude:
The beds of waters influenced by the tides or that are navigable-in-fact
were state-owned in trust for the public, while lands submerged beneath
non tidal, non-navigable waters could be privately owned. Sovereign
lands and private lands existed side-by-side, with the lands critically
important for navigation and fishing in public hands. 229
B. Fixed Versus Evolving Theories ofPublic Rights

After determining the property boundaries and whether a public trust
easement exists, courts must then define the scope of uses protected by the

221. Kilbert, supra note 10, at 33 (citing SLADE ET AL., supranote 220).

222. See Blumm, supra note 26, at 657. This Article builds on terms advanced by Professors
Blumm and Rose, distinguishing courts that take a "lineal title" approach from courts that take an
"easement" approach. Professor Michael Blumm described these property theories as lineal versus
overlapping. Id. at 655-59 (citations omitted).
223. See id. at 657.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.

227. Professor Blumm described the New Jersey Supreme Court's approach in Arnold v.
Mundy as typifying a lineal approach, as the court drew a bright property line and held that "Mundy
had no title to the submerged land in question because the sovereign owned the beds of tidal waters
in New Jersey, just as it did in England." See Blumm, supra note 26, at 655-56 (quoting Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 418 (1842)) (citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 50 (N.J. 1821)).
228. See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76-78.
229. Blumm, supranote 26, at 657.
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public trust doctrine in the public/private beach zone.230 While a minority of
courts applies what this Author calls a "fixed" theory of public trust rights, 31
majority of courts applies an "evolving" theory.232 Under a fixed theory, courts
freeze public rights as those recognized in seventeenth century England and at
the founding of the United States: the triumvirate of commerce, navigation, and
fishing.233 In contrast, under an evolving theory, courts reject the notion that
public trust rights are strictly enumerated and define these rights to reflect
society's values, needs, and current uses of trust property. 234
The decision by the Maine Supreme Court in Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell
235
236
In that case, the
R) exemplifies a fixed theory of common law public rights.
court explained that public rights in Maine historically included "fishing,
fowling, and navigation (whether for recreation or business) and any other uses
reasonably incidental or related" to those rights.237 The court saw these public
rights as "long-established property rights" in the form of an easement on private
fees that the state could not simply alter to accommodate new public needs. 238
To do so, according to the court in Bell II, may run afoul of "constitutional
prohibitions on the taking of private property without compensation." 239
Referring to the public rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation as "the ancient
easement," the court rejected the assertion that adding rights for bathing,
sunbathing, and recreational walking would be "no more burdensome" on the
private landowner. 240
The rationale that undergirds this fixed theory of public uses is that it
reasonably anchors public rights and does not burden private property by
requiring accommodations for "new recreational needs." 24 Proponents of the
theory critique the evolving public rights theory on the grounds that such an
open-ended interpretation of public uses would make private property rights on

230. See Kilbert, supra note 10, at 58.
231. See Donahue, supranote 37, at 599.
232. See id. at 599-600 (citations omitted).
233. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 173-74 (Me. 1989) (citations
omitted) (explaining that the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 of the Massachusetts Bay Colony fixed
public rights in the seventeenth century by reserving "out of the fee title granted to the upland
owner a public easement only for fishing, fowling, and navigation").
234. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 609 (N.H. 1994) ("Rights of navigation
and fishery are not the whole estate but rather the public trust lands are held for the use and benefit
of all the [public], for all useful purposes . . . ." (quoting Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718,
721 (N.H. 1890))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
235. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
236. Id. at 169.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (invalidating Maine's Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act-which declared an
unlimited right in the public to use the intertidal land for "recreation"-as an unconstitutional taking
without compensation because it expanded the common law easement).
240. Id. at 175.
241. See id. at 169.
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beaches ephemeral and uncertain.242 For instance, the court in Bell H was
concerned that, if it recognized a new general recreation easement allowing the
public not only to walk, but also to sunbathe, picnic, play sports, or swim,
private beaches would become indistinguishable from public beaches
specifically acquired by the government for those general purposes. 243 As this
Article explains further in Part V, in addition to Maine's Bell H decision, courts
in Massachusetts have similarly applied a fixed theory of public trust rights to
deny public beach walking in the public/private beach zone.
Nevertheless, the application of a fixed theory of public trust rights is not as
determinative of public beach access for beach walking as it may seem.245 While
some courts apply a fixed theory of public rights to deny the public the right to
walk on beaches, 246 others-such as courts in Michigan and North Carolinainclude beach walking in the fixed historic rights of "passage and
repassag[e] .247

In contrast, courts that apply an evolving theory of public rights recognize
*
249
protections for beach walking,28 access for scuba diving,
or protections for
even beyond that
25-and
zone
beach
public/private
general recreation in the
zone, into the privately held uplands.251 In situations in which a private property
owner takes title to the low-water mark, courts apply an evolving theory of

242. Id. at 174, 175 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974)) (noting
that Maine has "no reported case where a claim of a public easement for general recreation such as
bathing, sunbathing, and walking on privately owned intertidal land has even been asserted").
243. See id. at 176.
244. See infra Part V.
245. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005) ("[W]alking along the lake
shore is inherent in the exercise of traditionally protected public rights of fishing, hunting, and
navigation .... ).
246. See Bell II, 557 A.2d at 176-79 (citations omitted) (invalidating as unconstitutional
Maine's Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act, which declares an unlimited right in the public to use
the intertidal land for recreation, hinging on the fixed theory of public rights); Opinion of the
Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566 (applying a fixed theory of public rights to determine that the new right
of passage on foot constituted an unconstitutional taking).
247. See, e.g., Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62, 74 (citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (N.J.
1821)) (holding that beach walking is inherent in the exercise of traditional public trust rights);
West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d 601, 617, 618 (N.C. 1985) ("The long standing right of the public to pass
over and along the strip of land lying between the high-water mark and the low-water mark adjacent
to respondent's property is well established beyond need of citation.").
248. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545, 579 (N.J. 1972).
249. McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 624 (Me. 2011).
250. Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986) (citing Treuting v.
Bridge & Park Comm'n of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627, 632-33 (Miss. 1967)).
251. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365-66 (N.J. 1984)
(evaluating factors to determine that passage across private beaches and use of private beaches is
incidental and necessary to the enjoyment of public recreational rights in tidelands); Borough of
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (N.J. 1972) ("[W]here the
upland sand area is owned by a municipality ... the public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and
the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms . . . .").
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public rights to protect public rights in the public/private beach zone for multiple
uses, ranging from access for scuba diving to ecological protection.252
For example, Marks v. Whitney exemplifies an evolving theory of common
law public rights. In that case, the court determined whether the respondent
could fill and develop tidelands to which he had title when such actions would
cut off his neighbor's access to the ocean.253 The California Supreme Court
described public rights as "sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public
needs" and held that the court was "not burdened with an outmoded
classification" of rights.254 The court included as protected public trust rightsbased on "a growing public recognition" of its importance-"the preservation of
those [tide]lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units
for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and
habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and
climate of the area."255 Thus, the court applied an evolving theory of public
rights, along with an easement approach based on a sovereignty theory, and held
that Marks did not have the right to fill and develop the tidelands to which he
held title.256 The court reasoned that Marks' jus privatum was subject to public
rights to protect the area as an open natural space.257 Similarly, as explained
further in Part V, courts in New Jersey, New Hampshire, Maine, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin have explicitly adopted an evolving theory of public trust rights.258
V. BEACH ACCESS CASES

A majority of states maintains the division of title between private owners
and the state at the mean or ordinary high-water mark-consistent with the
nature of the proper the federal government transferred to the states when they
entered the Union.
In these high-water states, beach walking is usually
allowed in the public/private beach zone.260 Even in high-water states, however,

252. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380-81 (Cal. 1971) (denying tideland development
and recognizing ecological protections that would limit public access to land to which the owner
had title in a high-water state, and recognizing ecological protection as a public trust use);
McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 636 (allowing access for scuba diving in a low-water state).
253. See Marks, 491 P.2d. at 377, 380-81 (citing Colberg, Inc. v. State, 342 P.2d 3, 12 (Cal.
1967)).
254. Id. at 380 (citing Colberg,342 P.2d at 12).
255. Id. at 380. The court similarly noted that it was not necessary for it to "define precisely
all the public uses which encumber tidelands." Id.
256. See id. at 380, 381 (citing Colberg,342 P.2d at 12).
257. Id. at 381.
258. See infra Part V.
259. Frey & Mutz, supra note 25, at 910 n.20; Stephanie Showalter, No Right to Walk
Between High Water Mark and Water's Edge, 3:2 SANDBAR, July 2004, at 1, 6-7, available at
http://nsglc.olemiss.edu/SandBar/archives/vol3/2/index.html.
260. See, e.g., West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d 601, 618 (N.C. 1985) (finding that "passage by the
public by foot, vehicle and boat must be free and substantially unobstructed over the entire width of
the foreshore"). North Carolina is an example of a state in which the right of public access to

Published by Scholar Commons, 2013

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
328

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 295

boundary issues arise when individual deeds purport to grant title to land within
or below the public/private beach zone. 261 In those cases, the court's theory of
coastal property rights influences how the court interprets the deeds. Recall that
the California Supreme Court applied a sovereignty theory in Marks v. Whitney,
concluding that an easement existed in the public/private beach zone-thus

beaches for walking, as well as all forms of recreation, has long been recognized and protected. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2011) (declaring that "public trust rights ... include, but are not limited
to, the right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all recreational activities in the watercourses of
the State and the right to freely use and enjoy the State's ocean and estuarine beaches and public
access to the beaches."); Fabrikant v. Currituck Cnty., 621 S.E.2d 19, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(citing Friends of Hatteras Island Nat'l Historic Mar. Forest Land Trust for Pres., Inc. v. Coastal
Res. Comm'n of N.C., 452 S.E.2d 337, 348 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)). The dividing line of ownership
is the mean high-tide line on the North Carolina coast. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20 (2011); West, 326
S.E.2d at 617-18 (quoting Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 177 S.E.2d
513, 516 (N.C. 1970)). In West v. Slick, the North Carolina Supreme Court referred to this
demarcation line as reflecting a "long established rule that littoral rights do not include ownership of
the foreshore." West, 326 S.E.2d at 617. West did not directly address beach walking, but revolved
around a dispute regarding property owners' ability to establish a neighborhood public road, or
public road by prescription or dedication, across neighboring land. Id. at 602 (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 136-67 (2011)). After drawing this boundary line in the sand-and without reference to
English common law-the court nonetheless acknowledged the existence of overlapping rights in
the public/private beach zone. See id. For instance, although the beach below the mean high-tide
line is public property, a littoral owner has the right to place a pier in this area. Id. These littoral
rights are like a private easement on public land. Id. at 618. However, the owner must ensure that
"passage under the pier must be free and substantially unobstructed over the entire width" of the
public/private beach zone. Id. at 617 (quoting CarolinaBeach Fishing Pier, 177 S.E.2d at 516).
This means that from mean low to high tide, the pier must be at such a height that "the public will
have no difficulty in walking under it when the tide is low or in going under it in boats when the
tide is high .....
Id. (quoting Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, 177 S.E.2d at 516). Without
explanation or references, the court simply declared that "[t]he long standing right of the public to
pass over and along the strip of land lying between the high-water mark and the low-water mark
adjacent to respondents' property is well established beyond need of citation." Id. Then, the court
affirmed "once again" the rule that "passage by the public by foot, vehicle and boat must be free and
substantially unobstructed over the entire width of the foreshore ..... Id. at 618. Interestingly,
there are very few piers along North Carolina's ocean coast, and North Carolina's "Coastal Area
Management Act (CAMA) regulations implicitly prohibit" the construction of private ocean piers.
Kalo, supra note 23, at 1501, 1503-04 (citing 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 07H.0309(d)(1) (2002),
available at http://www.nccoastalmanagement.net/Rules/Text/tl5a_07h.pdf).
After West, North
Carolina codified the "customary free use and enjoyment of the ocean beaches" enjoyed by the
people of the State of North Carolina "from time immemorial." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d)-(e);
West, 326 S.E.2d at 601. When faced with a constitutional challenge to this provision, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals did not reach the merits: the litigants voluntarily dismissed the claim
based on the state's position that the provision did not create a public easement over the dry sand
area of the beach. Fabrikant,621 S.E.2d at 24, 31. However, Professor Joseph Kalo asserted that,
in North Carolina, the public has a common law customary right to use dry sand oceanfront
beaches, regardless of title. Kalo, supra note 23, at 1432 n.13.
261. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 n.5 (Cal. 1971) (citing Borax Consol.,
Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935); 111.Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892);
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 437 (Cal. 1970); City of Oakland v. Oakland WaterFront Co., 50 P. 277, 295 (Cal. 1897)) (discussing the nature of California's public trust lands where
tidelands were "patented as tidelands to [the plaintiff's] predecessor in title").
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reconciling a patent to the land down to the low-tide line in a state in which tidal
property is held by the state up to the high-tide line.262 Choice of theory also
influences the outcome for public rights in low-water states. A state's
recognition of private title to the low-water mark does not automatically
extinguish all public rights in the public/private beach zone.263
Beach access in the United States varies not only between states, 264 but also
within the same state.265 As noted, the property and common law theories
applied by a court, as well as the extent to which a court relies on English
common law, influence the outcome for public beach access. 266 This is most
readily observed when comparing decisions from states that share common legal
foundations. Parts V.A and V.B demonstrate this point by analyzing cases from
the former Massachusetts Bay Colony and from the former Northwest Territory
around the Great Lakes.
A.

The Former Massachusetts Bay Colony: Maine and Massachusetts

The beach access cases from Maine and Massachusetts present a rich
comparative body of state law because their intertidal property law is built upon
a shared legal foundation: the Massachusetts Bay Colony's Colonial Ordinance
of 1641-47.267 Under the Colonial Ordinance, private property ownership
extended from the uplands to the low-tide mark.
The Ordinance modified

262. Marks, 491 P.2d at 379 (quoting People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 87 (Cal. 1913))
(defining tidelands as the land extending up to the mean high-tide line and explaining that
California holds the tidelands in trust, but still recognizing private patents to some tidelands to the
low-tide line).
263. See id. at 381 (citing Newcomb v. City of Newport Beach, 60 P.2d 825, 829 (Cal. 1936);
Atwood v. Hammond, 48 P.2d 20, 24 (Cal. 1935)).
264. Compare Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974) ("[I]t was held that
the public rights in the seashore do not include a right to use otherwise private beaches for public
bathing." (citing Butler v. Att'y Gen., 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1907))), with Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (noting that the "[t]he public's right to use tidal
lands and water encompasses navigation, fishing, and recreational uses . . ." in low-water New
Jersey (citing Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J.
1972))).
265. Compare Matthews, 471 A.2d at 359 (stating that beach access was limited to municipal
residents by quasi-municipal organization), with Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 49-50
(citing Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 274 A.2d 860, 861 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1971)) (stating that municipal beach access was available only to nonresidents who
pay fees).
266. Compare Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 181 (Me. 1989) (noting that
state law determines public rights in intertidal land as "derive[d] from the prevailing interpretation
of the English common law" to arrive at fixed view), with McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620,
628, 636 (Me. 2011) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894)) (noting that, while state
public trust doctrine derives from English common law, characterization of scuba diving as
"navigation" under common law is not dispositive of the outcome).
267. See Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 275; McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 628-29.
268. See Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 275.
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seventeenth century English common law in the intertidal area 69-or
public/private beach zone-"to encourage commercial wharf development at
private expense." 270 When Maine separated from Massachusetts in 1820 to
become an independent state, Maine expressly followed Massachusetts property
law and extended private title to the ordinary low-tide line.27 1
From that common legal foundation, one might expect that state court
resolution of disputes over public access to the public/private beach zone would
be uniform. However, the supreme courts in Maine and Massachusetts have
followed different legal theories, producing divergent results.272 In McGarvey v.
Whittredge, the Maine Supreme Court took a sovereignty approach and found a
public trust easement, coupled with an evolving common law public rights
theory,273 and recognized public access for scuba diving.274 However, the Maine
Supreme Court and Massachusetts Supreme Court previously applied the lineal
title approach and fixed common law public rights theory-in the Maine case of
Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell f1) 2 75 and in the Massachusetts cases of Michaelson v.
Silver Beach Imp. Ass'n, Inc.276 and Opinion of the Justices277and denied
public access for recreation as well as for simply beach walking. 278
In 2011, the Maine Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the
public has the right to walk across the public/private beach zone to reach the
ocean for scuba diving in McGarvey v. Whittredge.279 The court traced the legal
development of private ownership and public rights in this zone back to its
origins in English common law and the easement approach that overlaps jus
privatum and jus publicum.280 After recounting the transfer of property under
the equal footing doctrine, the court explained that Maine modified its common
law to allow private ownership to the low-water mark; however, similar to
English common law, this property is "subject to the public trust rights reserved
to the State." 281 The court sought a legal interpretation that balanced what it

269. The intertidalarea is the zone between ordinary high and low tides.
270. McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 626. Interestingly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected
the "Massachusetts law that adopted the low-water mark as the boundary between public and
private ownership." Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 608 (N.H. 1994) (citing Concord Mfg.
Co. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 729 (N.H. 1890)).
271. McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 629-30 (citing ME. CONST. art. X, §§ 3, 5).
272. See, e.g., id. at 634-36 (taking a strong easement approach and applying a common law
public rights theory); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974) (taking a title
approach and applying a fixed common law public rights theory).
273. 28 A.3d 620 (Me. 2011).
274. See id. at 634, 636.
275. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
276. 173 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1961).
277. 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974).
278. See Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169, 175; Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 567;
Michaelson, 192 N.E.2d at 275, 278, 280.
279. McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 623.
280. See id. at 628 (citing Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1894)).
281. See id.
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called the "solidly established" rights of private property owners in the intertidal
zone with the public's "uninterrupted right to make appropriate use of those
lands."282 The court explicitly highlighted the public trust easement:
Important to this analysis is our conclusion that nothing in the Colonial
Ordinance, or the pronouncements of the common law ... evidenced an
intent to change or limit the jus publicum-the public's rights in the
intertidal lands-except to the extent that those rights might interfere
with the right of the landowner to wharf out. 283
This interpretation of the Colonial Ordinance presumes the continued
existence of a public trust easement unless explicitly altered. 284 Similar to the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central,the Maine Supreme Court cited
to Sir Matthew Hale's Treatise from 1787 in McGarvey to describe in greater
detail the jus privatum and jus publicum distinction between private title and
public use rights. 285
After finding a public trust easement and establishing that public rights are
not extinguished-even when title to the low-water mark is in the private
property owner-the court determined which public uses of this zone were
protected within the jus publicum.286 Dating back to the Colonial Ordinance, the
reserved public trust rights in the intertidal zone were rights connected to fishing,
287
fowling, and the passage of boats. However, unlike the Maine Supreme Court
decision in Bell II-highlighted above as exemplifying a fixed theory of common
law public rights 288 -the McGarvey court underscored the need for the common
289
law to be flexible to maintain its relevance to contemporary life.
In so doing,
the court stated that its "interpretation of the public trust rights has recognized
that some intertidal activities have come into favor and eventually fallen out of

282. See id. at 630.
283. Id. at 631.
284. See id.
285. See id. ("For the jus privatum of the owner or proprietor is charged with and subject to
that jus publicum which belongs to the king's subjects; as the soil of an [sic] highway is, which
though in point of property it may be a private man's freehold, yet it is charged with a publick
interest of the people, which may not be prejudiced or damnified." (quoting Hale, supranote 46, at
35)); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892) ("The jus privatum that is
acquired by the subject, either by patent or prescription, must not prejudice the jus publicum,
wherewith public rivers and the arms of the sea are affected to public use." (quoting Hale, supra
note 46, at 22)).
286. See McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 636.
287. Id. at 629 (citing JOHN J. WHITTLESEY, LAW OF SEASHORE, TIDEWATERS AND GREAT
PONDS INMASSACHUSETTS AND MAINE xxxvi-xxxvii (1932)).

288. See supra Part IV.B.
289. See McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 624 (quoting Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d 743, 749 (Me.
1976) (Dufresne, C.J., concurring)).
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use ... such as the use of the intertidal lands for pre-automobile travel and the
use of those lands for driving and resting cattle." 2 9
The court recounted that Maine's court decisions recognized a variety of
public trust rights bearing little direct connection to the traditional rights, such as
crossing intertidal lands by riding or skating on the ice, landing a boat and freely
passing to the lands and houses, digging for worms, and engaging in activities
for pleasure, business, or sustenance.2 91
Despite these expansions of the traditional scope of public rights, the
McGarvey court was mindful not to "unreasonably interfere" with riparian
rights.292 The Maine Supreme Court had previously applied a fixed common law
theory in Bell II and held that intertidal lands did not include a general recreation
easement.293 By contrast, the McGarve{ court rejected the notion that public
trust rights are strictly enumerated rights. 94 To limit public uses forever to those
uses that were in favor in the seventeenth century-as the Bell II court didwould severely restrict the use of this public/private beach zone to people who
walk "with a fishing rod, a gun, or a boat .... " 295 Instead, the McGarvey court
focused on whether crossing the intertidal zone for scuba diving was "among the
purposes consistent with the common law of the jus publicum, even when such
access is for activities that do not strictly fall within the triumvirate of
descriptors." 296 The McGarvey court reasoned that the jus publicum included the
public's right of passage and repassage, holding that public rights include the
right to walk across the intertidal zone to access the ocean for scuba diving.297
Thus, while the court made the case for an evolving theory of common law
public rights, it was careful to link back the new use-crossing the public/private
beach zone for scuba diving-to the historic use of this zone for "passage."298
Comparing the McGarvey and Bell II decisions of the Maine Supreme Court
demonstrates the power of legal theory to influence the outcome of decisions,
even within the same state.
Analyzing the beach access cases from Massachusetts further elucidates this
point. Similar to the littoral owners in Maine, littoral owners in Massachusetts

290. Id. at 632.
291. See id. (citing State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 888 (Me. 1952) (digging for worms);
Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 447-48, (1882) (business or sustenance); Deering v.
Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 64-65 (1845) (landing a boat)).
292. See id
293. See id. at 633 (citing Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell ll), 557 A.2d 168, 176 (Me. 1989)).
294. See id at 635.
295. See id
296. Id at 634. A concurring opinion of three justices criticized this approach, arguing that
crossing the intertidal zone to access the ocean for scuba diving fits within the seventeenth century
navigational use of the zone. See id at 642 (Levy, J., concurring).
297. Id at 636 (quoting Hale, supra note 46, at 36).
298. See id (quoting Hale, supra note 46, at 36).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss2/2

38

Scanlan: Shifting Standards: A Meta-Theory for Public Access and Private P
2013]

PUBLIC ACCESS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY ALONG THE COAST

333

hold title down to the low-water mark.299 However, the reasoning and outcome
for public beachgoers' rights was markedly different in Michaelson v. Silver
Beach Imp. Ass'n, Inc.300 than in Maine's McGarvey decision.301 The coastal
prope
in question in Michaelson contained a sea wall at the low-water
mark.
Applying a lineal title theory, the court determined that the state's
proper began where private property ended at the seawall and extended into the
ocean.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court decided Michaelson in 1961eleven years after the State of Massachusetts added sand below this sea wall and
built a beach that the Silver Beach Improvement Association's members and
others used for "usual beach purposes, such as sun-bathing, bathing, and
picnicking." 304 Despite the state investment in building the beach and its public
use for over a decade, the Massachusetts Supreme Court enjoined the beach
association from continuing to use the area for beach activities and held that the
littoral owners became the owners of the new beach down to the new low-water
mark.305

The Michaelson court was silent on English common law and the concept of
306
Instead, the court relied
ajus publicum easement burdening the private estate.
exclusively on state law, likening the state action of adding sand to build out the
beach to natural accretion: just as under the law of accretion, the littoral owners
obtained title to the new beach area down to the new low-water mark.307 This is
an unusual analysis for a beach renourishment project paid for by the state; such
projects are typically defined as avulsion, instead of accretion, placing the newly
created property in the state's domain.308

299. See Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass. 1961);
McGarvey, 26 A.3d at 626.
300. 173 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1961).
301. Compare id. at 275 (applying a fixed common law public right theory and holding littoral
owners' rights extended to low-water mark, subject only to public rights of navigation, fishing, and
fowling), with McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 634-36 (citations omitted) (applying an evolving common law
public rights theory-rejecting the notion that public rights are strictly enumerated-and holding
that public rights include access for scuba diving).
302. Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 275.
303. See id. (quoting Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 125 (Mass.
1909)).
304. See id. at 274.
305. See id at 280. This decision was based on an interpretation of the Colonial Ordinance of
1641-47, under which "private ownership along the tide waters was extended to the 'low-water
mark' . . . subject to the public rights of navigation, fishing, and fowling." Id. at 275 (quoting
Butler v. Attorney Gen., 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1907)).
306. See id. at 275-80.
307. See id. at 277-78.
308. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2612 (2010) (affirming the Florida Supreme Court's determination that, under Florida lawwhich draws the private property boundary at the high-tide line-the state action of adding sand to
create a beach on land that had previously been covered by ocean was an avulsion, not an accretion,
and thus the newly created land did not belong to the littoral property owner). Unlike an accretion,
which is a gradual buildup of land, an avulsion is a sudden buildup of land, which does not entitle
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Also motivating the decision was the court's view of public rights as fixed in
the seventeenth century: according to the court, the only specific powers of the
state to alter the shoreline "without compensation to private parties are those to
regulate and improve navigation and the fisheries." 30 The state has "no power
to build beaches for bathing purposes without compensating the littoral
owners. . . ."310 This is a particularly striking opinion, given that the state added
sand to property clearly in the public domain below the low-tide line.311 The
Michaelson decision highlights the power of a fixed theory of common law
public rights to favor private property owners' exclusive use of the shore, even in
the face of facts that would seem to indicate a different result.
Similarly, in an advisory opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
considered whether a proposed bill creating an "on-foot right-of-passage" in the
intertidal zone was permissible. 312 The Opinion of the Justices313 case turned on
a fixed theory of common law public rights-solidified in the terms of the
Colonial Ordinance-that allowed the public to use the public/private beach
zone for fishing and navigation.314 The court noted that it was "unable to find
any authority that the rights of the public include a right to walk on the
beach." 3 15 The court indicated that, in other states-where the property
boundary between public and private is drawn at the high-water mark-public
rights in the beach are broader. 16 However, where private property runs to the
low-water mark and beach walking is not seen as fitting within seventeenth

the littoral property owner to a change in the property boundary. See id. at 2598 (citing Cnty. of St.
Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 66-67 (1874); Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund v. Sand Key Ass'n, 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987)). According to the Florida Supreme
Court, "if an avulsion exposes land seaward of littoral property that had previously been submerged,
that land belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner's contact with the water." Id. at
2611. The U.S. Supreme Court-unlike the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Michaelson--based
its decision entirely on finding that the state action at issue was an avulsion, without regard to
whether the public trust rights included beach recreation and bathing. See id.; Michaelson, 173
N.E.2d at 277-78. Additionally, many beach renourishment projects now involve federal funding
and the Army Corps of Engineers, requiring public access easements for all nourished beaches. See,
e.g., Chiesa v. D. Lobi Enter., No. C-296-06, 2012 WL 4464382, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Sept. 28, 2012) (involving circumstances in which the Army Corp of Engineers required a state to
certify prior to construction of a beach replenishment project that it obtained permanent public
access easements for all nourished beaches).
309. See Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 277.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 274, 277.
312. Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E. 2d 561, 564-66 (Mass. 1974).
313. 313 N.E. 2d 561 (Mass 1974).
314. See id. at 566.
315. Id. at 567.
316. See id.; see, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47,
50, 53) (N.J. 1972) (discussing public rights in New Jersey, where the property boundary is at the
high-water mark).
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century public uses for navigation and fishing, the justices opined that a new
statute allowing beach walking would be a physical taking of private property. 317
Thus, although both Maine and Massachusetts draw the private title line at
the ordinary low-tide line, 318 in Maine, the public has a right to cross the
public/private beach zone for scuba diving based on a public trust easement in
this zone that evolves over time to remain relevant to contemporary society. 319
However, in Massachusetts, where the court views public rights as fixed in the
seventeenth century uses, the public does not even have the right to walk in this
zone, nor does the state have the power to create public beaches below the lowwater mark by state-funded beach renourishment projects without paying
compensation to adjacent private property owners. 320
B. The Former Northwest Territory Around the Great Lakes: Wisconsin,
Michigan, Ohio, and Minnesota

Like the shared historical origins of Maine and Massachusetts in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony's Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47,321 the Great Lakes
states of Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and Minnesota have mutual origins in the
Northwest Territory.322 For areas that were part of the Northwest Territory
before statehood, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 is generally considered part

317. See id. at 568. The Supreme Court of Maine similarly held that Maine's Public Trust in
Intertidal Land Act, which created a comprehensive recreational easement and recognized public
rights beyond the traditional scope of the Colonial Ordinance, was an unconstitutional taking
without compensation. See Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell Il), 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me. 1989). The
court grounded its decision in the terms of the Colonial Ordinance and interpreted public rights as
an easement limited to fishing, fowling, and navigation. See id. at 174. Further, in Groves v.
Secretary, Department ofNatural Resources & Environmental Control, a Delaware court mirrored
the Massachusetts Supreme Court's analysis while applying a state law that recognizes private
littoral title to the low-water mark. See C.A. No. 92A-10-003, 1994 WL 89804, at *5-6 (Del.
Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1994) (citations omitted). The Groves court stated that the public trust rights in
states in which littoral owners' title stops at the high-water mark were "of no value at all" to decide
the case. See id. at *5. While private property owners in Delaware need to accommodate the
"superior" public rights to navigate and fish in the foreshore, these rights do not include "access to
the foreshore for walking and/or recreational activities." See id. at *6. Thus, the court opined that,
if a court or legislature grants such a public right, "the State will have to compensate the affected
landowners for a takings [sic]." Id. The court's decision, while recognizing some limited
overlapping rights in the foreshore, did not refer to English common law and the rights included in
the jus publicum in this public/private beach zone. See id. at *5-6 (citations omitted). It also
ascribed to a fixed theory of the common law-one that recognizes public rights related only to
navigation and fishing. See id. at *6 (citing Bickel v. Polk, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 325, 325 (1851);
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Delaware, Civ. A. No. 12553, 1993 WL 181297, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 18,
1993); State v. Pa. R.R. Co., 237 A.2d 579, 580 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967), aff'd, State ex rel. Buckson
v. Pa. R.R. Co., 267 A.2d 455 (Del. 1969)).
318. McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 626 (Me. 2011).
319. See id. at 626, 635, 636.
320. See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 567-68.
321. See supra Part V.A.
322. See NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787 § 1, reprintedin 1 U.S.C. at LVII (2012).
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of the foundation of each state's public trust doctrine: this Ordinance, in essence,
required each state to hold all navigable waters, as well as the lands beneath and
between them, in trust for the public's shared use and enjoyment. 323
Specifically, the Northwest Ordinance declared navigable waters and "the
carrying places" between them as "common highways" that were to be "forever
free" for all inhabitants of the territory. 324
Despite their common legal foundation in the Northwest Ordinance, the
Great Lakes states vary considerably in their approaches to private property
ownership and public access along their navigable waters.325 Similar to case law
in Maine, Wisconsin's decisions are inconsistent with regard to theory, law, and
results. 326 Michigan and Minnesota clearly find a public trust easement in the
327
And Ohio provides a distinct outlier example of a
public/private beach zone.
lineal title approach at work.328
Michigan's Glass v. Goeckel3 29 is the first-and still the only-case among
the Great Lakes states to directly decide whether the public has a right to walk
the shores of any of the Great Lakes.330 With 3,288 miles331 of Great Lakes
coastline, Michigan has more coastline than any other state, with the exception
of Alaska; 332 accordingly, the decision has had an extensive impact within
Michigan's borders, and it provides a modem and historically grounded template
for other states wrestling with beach access disputes.
In Glass v. Goeckel, the court upheld the public's right to enjoy beach
walking in the public/private beach zone along Michigan's vast Great Lakes

323. Id. § 12 art. IV, reprintedin I U.S.C. at LIX (2012).
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62, 73-74 (Mich. 2005) (concluding that all
land below ordinary high-water mark is held in trust for the public and applying a fixed common
law theory to allow beach walking based on a traditional right of passage); State v. Korrer, 148
N.W. 617, 623 (Minn. 1914) (citations omitted) (holding that, while private property runs to the
low-water mark and Minnesota's property law is informed by common law, each state is free to
determine property rights suitable to each state's conditions).
326. See, e.g., R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628 N.W.2d 781, 787, 790 (Wis. 2001)
(citing State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Wis. 1987)) (declaring that the state has always held
title up to the high-water mark, applying the public trust easement theory, and holding that private
rights below the ordinary high-water mark are limited and subordinate to public trust rights);
Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 398 (Wis. 1928) (declaring that private property extends to the low
water mark, applying a lineal title theory, and holding that beach walking in the normal
public/private beach zone, without water present, was a trespass on the private riparian owner's
property).
327. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 73; Korrer, 148 N.W. at 623.
328. See State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 948 (Ohio 2011).
329. 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005).
330. See id. at 61.
331. This is the equivalent of 5,294 kilometers.
332. Great Lakes Facts

and Figures, GREAT

LAKES

INFORMATION

NETWORK,

http://www.great-lakes.net/lakes/ref/lakefact.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). The total shoreline of
the Great Lakes in the United States and Canada-including connecting channels, mainland, and
islands-is 10,900 miles, or 17,549 kilometers. Id.
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coastline. 333 An easement approach based on a sovereignty theory infused this
decision; however, rather than relying on an evolving common law theory, the
court grounded beach walking rights in the traditional public trust rights of

"passage."334
The dispute in Glass v. Goeckel arose when a lakefront property owner
brought a trespass claim against a neighbor for walking along the public/private
beach zone.
In that case, the private landowner along Lake Huron held "title
to the water's edge." 336 Given that this deed expressed title below the ordinary
high-water mark, the issue before the court was "how the public trust affects that
title." 337 The Michigan Supreme Court drew the line between public and private
property along the Great Lakes at the ordinary high-water mark, explaining that
all land below that mark was held in trust for the public. 338 However, the court
acknowledged that some lakeshore property deeds-such as the one before itdescribed private property boundaries below this mark.339 Like the deeds
involved in the California case of Marks v. Whitney,340 or the Ohio case of State
ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Resources, deeds in Michigan may set

the private property boundary at the low-water mark, or water's edge, which is
somewhere below the ordinary high-water mark.341 However, unlike the Ohio
Supreme Court, Michigan rejected the lineal title approach that "private title
necessarily ends where public rights begin."342
Given the existence of these variable terms in deeds, the court needed a legal
theory that reconciled private title descriptions that were seemingly at odds with
state ownership of navigable waters up to the ordinary high-water mark. 343 The

333. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62.
334. See id. at 63-64, 73-74.
335. Id. at 61.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 63 n.5.
338. See id. at 62. "Michigan's courts have adopted the ordinary high-water mark as the
landward boundary of the public trust." Id. at 69.
339. See id. at 70.
340. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
341. Marks, 491 P.2d at 377, 379; Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 70; State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't
of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Ohio 2011).
342. Compare Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 70 (holding that the "boundary of the public trust need
not equate with the boundary of a landowner's littoral title"), with Merrill, 955 N.E.2d at 948
(determining that the "natural shoreline" delineates the boundary between public and private
property).
343. If the issue of validity of private ownership lakeward of the ordinary high-water mark had
been raised in Wisconsin, the court's reasoning may have been different because of Wisconsin's
clear prohibition against any conveyance of lakebed for purely private purposes. See Priewe v. Wis.
State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918, 922 (Wis. 1896). Although Wisconsin's legislature
has made grants of public trust property, that property may only be used for public purposes, and
such grants do not operate to transfer the legal title from the state. City of Madison v. State, 83
N.W.2d 674, 678 (Wis. 1957). Further, the rights vested in grantees of trust property are extremely
limited: the state merely gives the grantee the ability to use the property-a privilege that is
revocable at any time. See id. For instance, the legislature gave the City of Madison permission to
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court in Glass v. Goeckel applied a sovereignty theory that led to the finding of a
public trust easement,344 while also distinguishing private title from public
rights. 345 Similar to the California Supreme Court in Marks v. Whitney, 6 the
Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that, although the state may "convey
lakefront property to private parties, it necessarily conveys such property subject
to the public trust." 34
Similar to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in R. W Docks & Slips v.
Wisconsin, the Michigan Supreme Court highlighted that, on navigable waters,
public rights limit private title-a concept that is "vital" to public trust law. 348
The Michigan Supreme Court based its holding on a view of the public trust
doctrine as a limitation on state sovereignty: in other words, because the state
cannot abdicate its trustee responsibilities to protect public rights in the Great
Lakes and its beaches up to the ordinary high-water mark-even if the state had
issued patents to private parties that extended below the high-water mark-it
could not have conveyed away the public trust easement. 34 9 The court declared
that "the sovereign must preserve and protect navigable waters for its people." 350
Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court reconciled potential conflicts between
private title and public rights by recognizing an easement that accommodates the
coexistence of private title and public rights.351 Drawing on historic English
common law concepts ofjus privatum andjus publicum, the court dissolved the
potential dissonance.352 To the court, whether private property extends to the
high- or low-water mark is irrelevant to the question of public rights: "Because
the public trust doctrine preserves public rights separate from a landowner's fee

use trust property to build a civic center on Lake Monona, while continuing to vest ownership and
trust responsibilities in the state. See id. at 675, 678. Continued use of that trust property, however,
does not give Madison title to the property. See id. at 678. A lakebed grant in Wisconsin is
conceptually like the state granting a private easement on public lands.
344. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65, 74, 75.
345. Id. at 70.
346. 491 P.2d 374 (1971).
347. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65 (emphasis added); see Marks, 491 P.2d at 382 (citing Yates v.
Milwuakee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1870)). In Wisconsin, the state cannot convey property to
the lakebed below the ordinary high-water mark. Ill. Steel Co. v. Bilot, 84 N.W. 855, 856 (Wis.
1901). Wisconsin did allow private title to river beds-but, like Michigan, Wisconsin only did so
while preserving public trust protections. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 819
(Wis. 1914) (citing Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273 (Wis. 1898)).
348. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65, 68 (asserting that, for navigable waters, a vital distinction exists
between private title and the public rights limiting that title); R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628
N.W.2d 781, 788 (Wis. 2001) (asserting that the rights of riparian owners are subject to the interest
of the state and rights of the public in navigable waters (citing State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 498
(Wis. 1983))).
349. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62, 65. At one point in the decision, the court clearly stated
that "the state lacks the power to diminish those [public trust] rights when conveying littoral
property to private parties." Id. at 62.
350. Id. at 63.
351. See id. at 69-70.
352. See id.
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title, the boundary of the public trust need not equate with the boundary of a
landowner's littoral title." 3 Private title and public rights "may overlap" as
they did under English common law.354 Thus, the Glass v. Goeckel court
concluded that "private title of littoral landowners remains subject to the public
trust beneath the ordinary high-water mark." 355 In so doing, the court noted that
recognizing what is essentially a public trust easement is not "novel" because
other states-such as Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Pennsylvania,
and California-"have similarly accommodated the same practical challenge of
fixing boundaries on shifting waters: they acknowledged the possibility of public
rights coextensive with private title." 356
Based on its finding of an inalienable public trust easement, the Michigan
Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' lineal title approach to coastal
rights, which-just like Wisconsin's 1923 decision in Doemel v. Jantz35 7 granted the private property owner exclusive use of the beach.358 The Michigan
Supreme Court described the grant of exclusive use in the private title holder as
an erroneous decision that "upset the balance between private title and public

rights along our Great Lakes and disrupted a previously quiet status quo."3
Additionally, Glass v. Goeckel provides a window into the Michigan
Supreme Court's view of the takings provision and whether littoral rights include
the right to exclude the public from the public/private beach zone.
Although
the court considered littoral rights to be property, the court also noted that these
rights are subject to the "paramount" public trust, the exercise or protection of
which does not require the state to pay compensation to the landowner.361 The
court expounded that "[b]ecause private littoral title remains subject to the public
trust, no taking occurs when the state protects and retains that which it could not

353. Id. at 70.
354. Id. at 70, 76.
355. Id. at73.
356. Id. at 70. See also Bess v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 401 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (noting that it is "well established" that riparian title to the low-water mark remained subject
to the public trust between high and low-water marks); State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 623 (Minn.
1914) (stating that, even if a riparian owner holds title to the ordinary low-water mark, the owner's
title is absolute only to the ordinary high-water mark, and the intervening shore space between highand low-water mark remains subject to the rights of the public); North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530
N.W.2d 297, 301 (N.D. 1995) (stating that neither the state nor the riparian owner held absolute
interests between high- and low-water mark); Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Ass'n, 141 A.2d 583, 585
(Pa. 1958) (subjecting private title held to low-water mark to public rights up to high-water mark);
Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 801 (S.D. 1915) (stating that, even if a riparian owner holds title
to the ordinary low-water mark, the owner's title is absolute only to the ordinary high-water mark
and the intervening shore space between high- and low-water mark remains subject to the rights of
the public).
357. 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923).
358. Compare Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 61, 71 (rejecting the court of appeals' lineal title
approach), with Doemel, 193 N.W. at 398 (granting riparian owners exclusive use of the beach).
359. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 61.
360. See id. at 71, 78.
361. Id. at 73 n.24 (quoting Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, 168 (Mich. 1930)).
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alienate: public rights held pursuant to the public trust doctrine."362 Its rationale
is nearly identical to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reasoning in R. W Docks
regarding the limitations of riparian rights that overlap with public rights in the
water. 36 Thus, Glass v. Goeckel and R. W Docks stand for the proposition that a
private property owner's takings claim related to activity in the public/private
beach zone, or the water beyond, is very weak in states that subscribe to a
sovereignty theory and find an inalienable public trust easement-a state cannot
take what it already holds in trust.364
After determining that regardless of who holds title in the public/private
beach zone, a public trust easement will always exist, the Glass v. Goeckel court
explained that "walking along the lakeshore is inherent in the exercise of
traditionally protected public rights of fishing, hunting, and navigation ... ."365
Pursuant to Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787-the "forever free"
provision-the court said it "must protect the Great Lakes as 'common
highways."'366 Hence, Michigan's "public trust doctrine permits pedestrian use
of [the] Great Lakes, up to and including the land below the ordinary high-water
mark." 67
The court described this public trust right as a "common sense assumption,"
noting agreement among the litigants that walking along the shore falls within
traditionally protected public trust rights.368 A "right of passage over land below
the ordinary high-water mark" is necessary to engage in other protected public
rights of "fishing, hunting, and navigation for commerce or pleasure."36 The
court noted that other states, such as New Jersey and Connecticut, have also
370
recognized a right of passing and repassing as part of the public use of waters.
The court reasoned that "gaining access to the Great Lakes to hunt, fish, or boat
required walking to reach the water. Consequently, the public has always held a
right of passage in and along the lakes."371
Similar to the Maine Supreme Court's McGarvey decision, the Glass v.
Goeckel decision focused on the traditional rights of passage and repassage
contained within the public trust easement. 37
However, while the Maine

362. Id. at 78.
363. See id.; R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Wis. 2001).
364. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65, 78; R. W Docks, 628 N.W.2d at 790.
365. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62.
366. Id. at 74 (quoting NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787 § 12 art. IV, reprintedin 1 U.S.C. at
LIX (2012)).
367. Id. at 62. The court held that private property owners would contravene the public trust if
they excluded beach walking below the ordinary high-water mark, concluding that a "plaintiff does
not interfere with defendants' property rights when she walks within the public trust." Id. at 75.
368. Id. at 73-74.
369. Id. at 74.
370. See id.
371. Id.
372. See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 636 (Me. 2011) (noting Maine's history of
private ownership and how public trust rights have always allowed the public to "cross the wet sand
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Supreme Court more clearly endorsed an evolving theory of the common law to
recognize a newer public use for scuba diving, the Michigan Supreme Court
couched its holding squarely in traditional public trust uses because traveling by
foot along beaches is both an historical and contemporary use of the
public/private beach zone.373 Glass v. Goeckel exemplifies how a fixed common
law theory can be applied to allow beach walking based on the traditional public
right of passage.374 However, Michigan does not extend this traditional right to
include a perpendicular right of passage across private property to reach lands
and waters held in trust.37 Establishing its decision as one based on tradition
and stability, the court concluded: "In this way, we preserve littoral title as
landowners have always held it, and we preserve public rights always held by the
state as trustee." 376
In a contrasting decision from another former Northwest Territory state, the
Ohio Supreme Court applied a lineal title approach and favored exclusive use by
private property owners along Lake Erie. 37 That case addressed structures built
along the shore that implicated beach walking. 378 Lake Erie lakefront property
owners sued to prevent the Ohio Department of Natural Resources from
requiring leases to build structures-such as docks-below the ordinary highwater mark.379 Similar to Michigan's Glass v. Goeckel private property owner,
these lakefront property owners claimed their deeds showed that their boundaries
extended farther into the lake than this mark.380 In 2011, the Ohio Supreme
Court determined in State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't ofNaturalResources that

the public trust on Lake Erie did not extend to the ordinary high-water mark, but
instead stopped at the natural shoreline, which is below the ordinary high-water

to reach the ocean"); Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 74 (noting that, under the public trust doctrine, "the
public has always held a right of passage in and along the lakes").
373. Compare McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 638-39 (expanding the public trust doctrine to include
walking along the beach), with Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62 (noting that, to use the beach for the
traditionally protected rights under the public trust doctrine, one necessarily needed to walk along
the shore).
374. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62.
375. Id. at 74 n.26. In contrast, New Jersey protects public rights in private uplands based on
the public trust doctrine. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J.
1984).
376. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 76.
377. See State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 950 (Ohio 2011).
378. See id. at 941. Although the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Merrill did not directly
address beach walking, intervenors from the National Wildlife Federation and the Ohio
Environmental Council argued about beach walking in the lower courts. See State ex rel. Merrill v.
Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007 & 2008-L-008, 2009 WL 2591758, at *11 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2009). The Ohio Court of Appeals' opinion in Merrill discussed beach walking, see id.
(providing that the public has a right to walk the shore but only lakeward of the water's edge), while
the Ohio Supreme Court ultimately held that the public had no public trust right to use the shore
above the natural shoreline. See Merrill,955 N.E.2d at 950.
379. See Merrill,2009 WL 2591758, at *1.
380. See Glass, 703 N.W. 2d at 61; Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, at *1.
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mark.381 Thus, the Merrill court took a lineal title approach, making no
reference to the jus publicum easement or English common law.382
One may infer from Merrill that the Ohio Supreme Court, contrary to the
U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois Central, the Michigan Supreme Court in Glass v.
Goeckel, or the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Diana Shooting Club, does not

view the public trust doctrine as inherent in state sovereignty.3 83 The opinion
lacks any justification or rationale for its variance from maintaining public
ownership of lands that the federal government transferred to Ohio when it
entered the Union. 384 Instead, the court simply used a lineal title lens and
applied a kind of quid pro quo reasoning that, "if a littoral owner has no property
rights lakeward of the natural shoreline, then the territory of the public trust does
not extend landward beyond the natural shoreline." 385 The Ohio Supreme Court
defined the title boundary as the same boundary for public rights; thus, the
decision would likely preclude beach walking above the "natural shoreline."38 6
Minnesota has similarly drawn the private property boundary below the
ordinary hi h-water mark: private property runs to the low-water mark in
Minnesota.
However, unlike the Merrill court's decision in Ohio, the
Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes a public trust easement in the
public/private beach zone.388 State v. Korrer did not involve beach walking,
but rather, it involved the rights of a riparian to mine ore in the public/private
beach zone. 390 Its relevance here, however, is to illustrate another application of
a public trust easement, coupled with an evolving public rights theory, in a state
that draws the riparian property boundary at the low-water mark.

381. See Merrill,955 N.E.2d at 949. The court defined the natural shoreline as "the line at
which the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes." Id. Although this demarcation
line is somewhat vague, it is probably somewhere below the ordinary high-water mark. Ohio's
approach is idiosyncratic and based on a codification of the boundary line by the Ohio General
Assembly at the "natural shoreline." See id.
382. See id. at 950.
383. Compare id. at 949 (recognizing private property rights when the owner's deed included
lands held in public trust), with Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (stating that
a state has ownership and control of land covered by tidal waters, subject to the interests of the
public in the waters), Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 88 (2005) (stating that the state's publictrust title is a function of its sovereignty) (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452-53), and Diana
Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (Wis. 1914) (providing that, "[a]s long as the state
secures to the people all the rights they would be entitled to if it owned the beds of navigable rivers,
it fulfills the trust imposed upon it").
384. See Merrill,955 N.E.2d at 946-50.
385. See id. at 948.
386. See id. at 948-49.
387. State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 623 (Minn. 1914).
388. Compare id. (recognizing a public trust easement in all the area between the high- and
low-water mark), with Merrill, 955 N.E.2d at 949 (determining that the public trust stops at the
natural shoreline below the high-water mark).
389. 148 N.W. 617.
390. Id at 618.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court described Minnesota's property law as
informed by English common law,391 but also clearly declared that each state is
free to determine property rights suitable to each state's conditions 392
3 "It is now
well settled . .. that this is not a federal question, but that each state must
determine for itself the question of the ownership of the soil underlying its public
waters." 393 The court analyzed English common law to assist in shaping
Minnesota's property rules related to lakefront properties. 394 However, the court
could find no judicial decisions "clearly defining rights in fresh water lakes or
rivers prior to the separation of the colonies from England." 395
After concluding that no uniformity existed among the states on these
property rules, the court determined that, in Minnesota, "the title of the
proprietor of lands abutting upon navigable waters extends to [the] low-water
mark." 396 Nonetheless, the court recognized an easement in the public/private
beach zone. 397 Although the riparian enjoys "proprietary privileges" in this
zone, the state retains a superior right: "The state may use [the public/private
beach zone] for any ... public purpose, and to that end may reclaim it during
periods of low water, and protect it from any use, even by the riparian owner,
that would interfere with its present or prospective public use, without
compensation." 398
In Minnesota, private title is "limited or qualified by the right of the public
to use the same for purpose of navigation or other public purpose."399 The
addition of the term "other public purpose" is consistent with an evolving theory
of public rights. The Minnesota Supreme Court viewed the law as evolving to
encompass waters valuable to the public for multiple purposes beyond one of the
original public trust purposes of commercial navigation. 400 For example, in
rejecting a commercial navigation test for whether the state held a water body in

391. See id. at 620 (citing Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 10 Minn. 82 (1914)).
392. Id. at 619 (citing Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876)).
393. Id (citing Barney, 94 U.S. at 338). Further, the court reasoned that because the United
States never owned the land under "public waters," but held it until it could transfer it to the newly
formed states, the Federal Government could not patent any land under these waters into private
ownership. Id. at 621 (citing Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903); St. Anthony Falls WaterPower Co. v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349, 359 (1897); Barney, 94 U.S. at 338; Franzini v.
Layland, 97 N.W. 499, 502 (Wis. 1903)). According to the court, "if the riparian owner acquires it
at all, it is by the concession or favor of the state which does own it." Id. (citing Hardin, 190 U.S. at
519; Barney, 94 U.S. at 338; Franzini,97 N.W. at 502).
394. See id. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
395. Id. at 619.
396. Id. at 621.
397. See id. at 623.
398. See id. (citing State ex rel. Anderson v. Dist. Court of Kandiyohi Cnty., 137 N.W. 298,
300 (Minn. 1912); Gniadck v. Nw. Improvement & Boom Co., 75 N.W. 894, 894-95 (Minn. 1898);
Carpenter v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 58 N.W. 295, 296 (Minn. 1894); Hanford v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 44
N.W. 1144, 1145 (Minn. 1890); People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 20 N.E. 577, 579-80 (N.Y.
1889)).
399. Id. (emphasis added).
400. See id. at 618 (quoting Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893)).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2013

49

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
344

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 295

trust, the court reconfirmed that "[t]o hand over all these lakes to private
ownership, under any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a great wrong
upon the public for all time, the extent of which cannot perhaps be now even
anticipated."4 01
Although no contemporary court decisions involve beach walking in
Wisconsin, controversies over public access continue to emerge outside the
courthouse.402 In a Milwaukee suburb, for instance, private property owners
along Lake Michigan urged the local government to fence off and post no
trespassing signs on the beach. 403 The legal rights at issue in this and other
controversies are confused by a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision issued
around a decade after DianaShooting Club, which erroneously drew the private
property boundary at the low-water mark of a lake; this decision has not been
explicitly overruled.404 Indeed, Doemel v. Jantz405 still stands as Wisconsin's
singular published court decision on the right of the public to walk along
lakeshores, and it exemplifies how the application of a lineal title approach and a
fixed theory of the common law favors exclusive private use of the shore.406
Doemel v. Jantz arose when a riparian landowner brought a claim for
trespass against a beach walker who traveled along the public/private beach
zone, adjacent to the landowner's property along Lake Winnebago.407 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court began its analysis by emphasizing the benefits of
riparian ownership and underscoring the importance of the private property right
to exclude.408 The court then identified seemingly conflicting decisions: some in

401. Id. at 618 (quoting Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the state did not obtain title to all waters-regardless of navigability-at the time of
statehood, it is free to define property rights and expand the scope of waters covered by the public
trust doctrine, as it did in this case. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012)
(explaining that, "[u]nder accepted principles of federalism, the States retain residual power to
determine the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders, while federal law
determines riverbed title under the equal footing doctrine").
402. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 1 (discussing a controversy involving private property
owners' attempt to block the public from accessing a privately owned neighborhood beach).
403. See McCoy, supranote 1.
404. See Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 398 (Wis. 1923). In Wisconsin, it has long been
settled that the state holds title in lakebeds up to the ordinary high-water mark, and Wisconsin does
not recognize any deeds that purport to convey private property below the ordinary high-water mark
of a lake or pond: "A government patent of land bordering on a lake or pond, regardless of the
boundaries thereof according to the government survey, does not convey title to the lands below the
line of ordinary high-water mark." Ill. Steel Co. v. Bilot, 84 N.W. 855, 856 (Wis. 1901); see also
State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 341, 342 (Wis. 1987) (citing Bilot, 84 N.W. at 856) (providing
that title to the beds of all lakes extends to the ordinary high-water mark and, thus, declaring that
those lakebeds cannot be part of private lands). Indeed, by 1901, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
addressed this issue "many times." See Bilot, 84 N.W. at 857 (citations omitted).
405. 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923).
406. See Doemel, 193 N.W. at 397.
407. See id. at 394.
408. See id. at 395-96 (citations omitted). In Wisconsin, riparian ownership includes the right
to build piers in aid of navigation, to use waters for domestic and agricultural purposes, and to
protect upland soil from erosion. Id. at 396.
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which the state held title to the high-water mark, such as Illinois Steel v. Bilot,409
and others in which the private landowner held title to the low-water mark, such
as Mariner v. Schulte.
While these cases could have been harmonized by
applying a sovereignty theory that recognizes an inalienable public trust
easement-as the court had previously done in Diana Shooting Club41-the
Doemel court viewed the law through a lineal title property lens. 412 When a
court applying a lineal title lens is faced with a case holding that the state
boundary extends to the high-water mark and another case holding that the
private property extends to the low-water mark, one case must be minimized,
ignored, or otherwise distinguished. Doemel distinguished the Bilot precedentthat the state holds title to the ordinary high-water mark-by taking the
extraordinary step of adding a new legal requirement that water must be present
up to the high-water mark for the public to assert any protected public trust
rights. 413
Ultimately, the Doemel court erroneously concluded that "[t]his
court ... has firmly declared that the title of a riparian owner on a navigable
inland meandered lake extends to [the] low-water mark." 4 14 The court gave the
drawing of this private title line to the low-water mark considerable weight in the
outcome of the decision, explaining that "[i]f the rights of riparian owners had
not attached or been declared by the courts [to go to the low-water mark], a
different situation would be presented." 415 Based on a lineal title approach,
when the court drew the private property boundary at the low-water mark, the
court asserted that a riparian owner's "rights to the shore are exclusive as to all

409. See id. at 397 (citing Bilot, 84 N.W. at 856).
410. See id. (citing Slauson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 69 N.W. 990, 991 (Wis. 1897) (holding
that private property boundary is the low-water mark); Mariner v. Schulte, 13 Wis. 775, 776 (1861)
(holding that proprietors hold title down to the low-water mark)). The Doemel court explained that
Diana Shooting Club stood for the proposition that "the public right to pursue the sport of hunting
to the ordinary water high-water mark of a navigable river [exists] while the waters of the river
actually extended to such mark." Id at 398.
However, this explanation ignores an explicit
statement by the court in DianaShooting Club:
Whether the right exists in the public to hunt on a navigable stream, between ordinary
high-water marks, which, owing to a low stage of water, is unnavigable, or on land
between such marks which has become dry or exposed, is not involved in this case, and is
not decided.
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914). Further, the Diana Shooting Club
case involved a navigable river in which the private riparian held title to the center; it was not a case
involving state title to the lakebed up to the ordinary high-water mark. See id.at 818. Additionally,
the Doemel court misstated the holding in Mariner v. Schulte-involving a dispute on a river where
private property boundaries ran to the center of the river-because the statement in that case about
property boundaries on ponds and lakes was dicta. See Mariner, 13 Wis. at 776, 781.
411. See DianaShooting Club, 145 N.W. at 819.
412. See Doemel, 193 N.W. at 398.
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. Id.
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the world, excepting only where those rights conflict with the rights of the public
for navigation purposes."416
The court then applied a fixed theory of public rights, focusing on the
original "navigation purposes" of the public trust doctrine, to explain that the
public had no rights in the public/private beach zone unless water was present to
facilitate navigation.417 The court reasoned that because water is necessary for
navigation, when water extends to the ordinary high-water mark, public rights
accordingly extend to navigation on that water-but when the waters recede, so
do public rights.418 Therefore, the court held that beach walking in the
public/private beach zone without water present was a trespass on the private
419
riparian owner's property.
If a beach walking dispute was revisited today in Wisconsin, a different
situation would be presented: the Doemel court's application of a lineal title
theory to exclude all public rights in the public/private beach zone is inconsistent
with most of the other Wisconsin Supreme Court cases, and it is certainly at odds
with all contemporary decisions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has confirmed
in numerous cases that the state holds title to the beds of navigable lakes up to
the ordinary high-water mark.420 Moreover, although individual deeds may
show property boundaries at the low-water mark or the water's edge of lakes,
Wisconsin does not recognize the validity of those deeds,421 and with regard to
navigable rivers, the court has clearly applied a public trust easement to private
title.
Indeed, in the present-day decision of R. W Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin,423
the Wisconsin Supreme Court reiterated that the state has held title to the
lakebed up to the high-water mark since "the instant of its admission into the

416. See id.
417. See id. at 397, 398.
418. See id.
419. See id.
420. See R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Wis. 2001) (quoting State
v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Wis. 1987)); Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d at 343-44 (quoting Ill. Steel
Co. v. Bilot, 84 N.W. 855, 856 (Wis. 1901)); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 517
(Wis. 1952); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914); Bilot, 84 N.W. at
856; see also Waterway and Wetland Permits: Ordinary High Water Mark, WIS. DEP'T OF
NATURAL RES., http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/waterways/general info/ohwm.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2013) (acknowledging that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has ruled that the state owns title to
lakebeds up to the ordinary high-water mark). Even with rivers and streams, in which the private
riparian holds title to the center of the stream, that title is not absolute, but qualified, and must give
way to public rights when a conflict arises. See, e.g., Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 517-18 (quoting
Franzini v. Layland, 97 N.W. 499, 502 (Wis. 1903)) (asserting the long-recognized property law
that private title must give way to public rights).
421. See Bilot, 84 N.W. at 856. In 1901, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that "[a]
government patent of land bordering on a lake or pond, regardless of the boundaries thereof
according to the government survey, does not convey title to the lands below the line of ordinary
high-water mark." Id.
422. See DianaShooting Club, 145 N.W. at 819.
423. 628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001).
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Union."424 While riparian rights below that mark may coexist and overlap with
public rights, they are limited by the public trust doctrine.425 Although not a
beach walking case, this public trust case provided important analysis and insight
regarding property rights on state-held lakebed and beaches, as well as
implications for related takings claims.
In R. W Docks, riparian landowners' qualified rights to use the lakebed
"strongly influenced" the court's evaluation of landowner R.W. Docks'
"investment backed expectations" for property that was located below the highwater mark and, thus, was "encumbered by the public trust doctrine and heavily
regulated from the get-go."426 The court reasoned that, "IfDocks had no private
property right to place boat slips on the lakebed at the marina, it cannot have
suffered an unconstitutional taking." 427
While Wisconsin recognizes
longstanding riparian rights, these rights are "qualified, subordinate, and subject
to the paramount interest of the state and the paramount rights of the public in
navigable waters." 428
The court illuminated its role: "We have jealously guarded the navigable
waters of this state and the rights of the public to use and enjoy them." 429 Given
the established relationship of private rights overlapping with, but subordinate to,
public rights in the public/private beach zone and into the lake, the court held the
Department of Natural Resources' denial of a permit to dredge the lakebed and
construct seventy-one boat slips on Lake Superior was not an unconstitutional
taking of property. 430 The Wisconsin Supreme Court's analysis of riparian rights
below the ordinary high-water mark as limited and subordinate to public trust
rights may inform future resolution of any beach walking disputes in Wisconsin
in the public/private beach zone.
The conceptualization of the court's role as guardian of the public's interests
in navigable waters, as well as the finding of an easement that recognizes
overlapping public and private rights,431 was similarly echoed by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in its 2005 beach walking decision in Glass v. Goeckel.432
The court noted that "the sovereign must sedulously guard the public's interest in
the seas for navigation and fishing-passed from English courts to the American
colonies, to the Northwest Territory, and, ultimately, to Michigan." 433

424. Id. at 787 (quoting Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d at 341).
425. See id. at 790-91.
426. See id. at 790.
427. Id. at 787.
428. Id. at 788 (citing State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 498 (Wis. 1983)).
429. Id. at 790 (quoting Delta Fish & Fur Farms, Inc. v. Pierce, 234 N.W. 881, 883 (Wis.
1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
430. See id. at 788-89, 791.
431. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62, 65-66 (Mich. 2005) (quoting Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894)) (distinguishing between private title and public rights, and asserting
that it is beyond the power of the state to diminish public rights when it conveys private title).
432. 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005).
433. Id. at 64.
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In sum, the states formed out of the former Massachusetts Bay Colony
(Massachusetts and Maine), as well as those formed out of the former Northwest
Territory (Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin), lack uniformity in how
they address public beach access, despite their shared legal foundations.
Maine's McGarvey decision, Wisconsin's R. W Docks and DianaShooting Club

decisions, Michigan's Glass v. Goeckel decision, and Minnesota's Korrer
decision all applied a sovereignty theory that supported finding an inalienable
public trust easement in the public/private beach zone.434 This easement
accommodates shared uses and public access. 435 Ohio's Merrill decision
provides a contemporary example of how a lineal title approach favors exclusive
use of the public/private beach zone by private property owners.436 Further, in
understanding the scope of public trust rights, Maine's Bell II decision,
Massachusetts'

Michaelson and Opinion of the Justices decisions, and

Wisconsin's Doemel v. Jantz decision all apply a fixed theory of public rights to
deny beach walking and general recreation in the public/private beach zone
where private title extends to the low-water mark or tide line.
These different approaches underscore that, even in states with the same
property laws, the results diverge depending on the legal theory animating the
decisions. Hence, in the low-water mark states of Maine and Massachusetts, a
court that finds an inalienable public trust easement and applies an evolving
common law theory will hold in favor of the public's right to cross the intertidal
zone to scuba dive, 38 while a court taking a lineal title approach and applying a
fixed public rights theory will advise that a proposed statute to secure beach
walking rights is an unconstitutional taking.
Similarly, in a Wisconsin
decision that drew the private property boundary at the low-water mark and
applied a fixed common law theory, the court denied the public's right to beach
walking, unless the walking takes place in the water.440 However, in a
Minnesota decision, the court recognized a public trust easement up to the high-

434. See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 636 (Me. 2011) (quoting Hale, supra note 46,
at 36); Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65; State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 621 (Minn. 1914); R. W Docks, 628
N.W.2d at 790; Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (Wis. 1914) (citing Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 383 (1891)).
435. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 70.
436. See State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 950 (Ohio 2011).
437. See Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell 1l), 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989); Opinion of the
Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974) (quoting Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement
Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 1961)); Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 277; Doemel v. Jantz, 193
N.W. 393, 395, 397 (Wis. 1923).
438. See, e.g., McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 636 (holding that, pursuant to common law, public trust
rights are at least broad enough to allow the public to cross intertidal lands and scuba dive).
439. See, e.g., Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169, 179 (holding that an act declaring an unlimited right in
the public to use intertidal land for recreation was unconstitutional because it amounted to the
taking of private property without compensation); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 568
(holding that a bill allowing physical intrusion onto privately owned shoreline would effectively
appropriate the property to a public use, thus constituting an unconstitutional taking).
440. See Doemel, 193 N.W. at 395, 397, 398.
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water mark, understanding the common law as evolving to protect multiple
public purposes beyond commercial navigation.441
Accordingly, these cases show that, in low-water mark states-or when
faced with deeds that contain boundaries below the ordinary high-water markif justices see a singular dividing line for title and public rights, the decisions
tend to favor private property owners' exclusive use of the public/private beach
zone. 442 In contrast, when justices see that the line for title purposes is not the
same as the line for public rights purposes-and therefore recognize a public
trust easement-the decisions accommodate multiple shared uses of the
public/private beach zone. 443 If the justices follow a sovereignty theory, they
will inevitably find a public trust easement in the public/private beach zone.4
The justices' choice of theory also influences the efficacy of a takings claim.
The recognition of an inalienable public trust easement weakens takings claims
related to public use of this area, even in low-water states, or when the
particulars of a deed indicate exclusive private ownership.445
Moreover, the application of a fixed theory of common law public rights can
strengthen private property rights vis Avis the public. Under this theory, public
use rights are limited to those originally recognized at the time the colonies
446
separated from England.
If a court describes these original rights as only
encompassing fishing, fowling, and navigation, it may then conclude-as the
Supreme Courts of Maine and Massachusetts did-that new statutes allowing
beach walking or public recreation are an expansion of these fixed public rights
and require compensation to private property owners.447 However, a fixed

441. See State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 618-21 (Minn. 1914) (citations omitted).
442. See Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 278, 280; State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural
Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 948, 950 (Ohio 2011) (quoting State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82
N.E.2d 709, 725-26 (Ohio 1948)); Doemel, 193 N.W. at 397, 398.
443. See, e.g., McGarvey, 28 A.3d at 625, 636 (declaring that the court would continue to
balance private ownership of tidal lands with public use of those same lands and holding that private
ownership of such lands has always been subject to the public's right to cross them to reach the
ocean); Korrer, 148 N.W. at 621-22, 623 (holding that a riparian owner's title extends to the lowwater mark but is only absolute to the high-water mark and, thus, his title to the intervening space
between the high-water and low-water marks is limited by the right of the public to use the same
property for public purposes).
444. See supra Part IV.A.
445. See, e.g., Korrer, 148 N.W. at 621 (holding that private title extends to the low-water
mark but also finding an inalienable public trust easement in the land up to that mark).
446. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
447. See Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell l), 557 A.2d 168, 179 (holding that Maine's Public
Trust in Intertidal Land Act, which created a comprehensive recreational easement, recognized
public rights beyond the traditional scope of the Colonial Ordinance and was an unconstitutional
taking without compensation); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567-68 (Mass 1974)
(quoting Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 1961))
(advising that a proposed beach walking statute would be an unconstitutional taking).
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theory does not necessarily exclude beach walking. 448 Michigan's Glass v.
Goeckel decision also applied a fixed public rights theory to uphold beach
walking rights as traditional public rights included in the "right of passage" and
as necessary to effectuate other rights of fishing and navigation.44 Michigan's
court held that beach walking has always been recognized within the historic
right of passage, as well as the Northwest Territory's "common highways" and
"forever free" protections for navigable waterways. 450 In so doing, Michigan
provides an example that is both contemporary and historically grounded.
C. Takings and Public Rights Beyond the Public/PrivateBeach Zone

In addition to the divergent approaches allowing beach walking in the
public/private beach zone, several high-water mark states have expanded
protections for public access and recreation onto beach uplands above the
public/private beach zone. This Part highlights examples from New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and California to demonstrate the potential Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional takings limitations on public beach access. The state
interest in creating comprehensive legislation to protect public access for beach
walking or general recreation on the coasts must be carefully crafted to avoid
running afoul of constitutional protections of private property. Although the
statutory creation of a comprehensive beach program is a lawful exercise of the
state's police power, the scope of the property involved in the program, as well
as the methods employed to facilitate public access, impact whether it is an
unconstitutional "taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, thus
-451
requiring the payment ofjust compensation.
The Supreme Court has identified two categories of per se regulatory
takings: regulations that compel a permanent physical "invasion" of property,
and re ulations that deny "all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."4
It is highly unlikely that legislation providing public access and
recreation on beaches could be shown to deny all economically beneficial or

448. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 62, 73-74 (Mich. 2005) (applying a fixed theory,
relying on the "traditionally articulated rights protected by the public trust doctrine," yet holding
that walking falls within the scope of the public trust).
449. See id. at 74.
450. See id.

451. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008-09, 1027-28, 1029 (1992)
(quoting S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-280(A)(2), -290(A) (1976 & Supp. 2012)).
452. Id. at 1015. Since Lucas, the Supreme Court clarified in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency that this rule applies narrowly to "cases in which
the property is rendered valueless." John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background
PrinciplesDefense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 931, 945 (2012) (citing Tahoe-

Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 329-31 (2002)). If a
regulation does not constitute a per se taking, it may nonetheless be a taking under the Penn Central
multifactor framework. See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 326 & n.23 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 633-34, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring), abrogation recognized by Vasko v.
United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 204 (Fed. Cl. 2013)).
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productive use of private property. A more likely scenario would be an
argument that such regulation compelled a permanent physical invasion of the
property. Government-compelled permanent physical occupations are per se
takings because they strike at the heart of the right to exclude others, which is
considered a fundamental property interest. 453 The Supreme Court clarified that
an easement allowing the public the right to pass may be considered a permanent
physical invasion, despite the variable public usage and regardless of the
economic impact.4 54
As with total regulatory takings, one may raise a background principles
defense to a permanent physical invasion takings claim.455 Thus, the Supreme
Court's decision in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council is releVant. 5 In
Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a state regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use will not be a taking if "the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with." 458 A primary issue that arises in the beach access context is whether the
statute is merely codifying an existing public right and corresponding limitation
on the private estate.
Such a background principles defense could bar a
takings claim brought on a permanent physical invasion theory.460 The Lucas
Court explained that "we assuredly would permit the government to assert a
permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the land owner's
title." 461
This opens up an inquiry into background principles of the state's property
462
laws.
As Professor Echeverria observed, the public trust doctrine provides a

453. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982), abrogation recognized by Seawall Assocs. v.
City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989); Robert Meltz, Substantive Takings Law: A
Primer 9 (Nov. 18, 2011).
454. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (quoting Loretto, 458
U.S. at 432-33 & n.9, 434-35).
455. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 230, 235 (2004), vacatedon
other grounds, 457 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006), aff'd, 552 U.S. 130 (2008).
456. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
457. See John R. Sand, 60 Fed. Cl. at 235.
458. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1031-32 (remanding to state court to determine whether a
takings claim based on new coastal setback rules, which prevented claimant from building on two
coastal lots, was barred based on background principles of state law).
459. See id. at 1027 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
460. See Meltz, supra note 453, at 38. According to Meltz, "This is unsurprising, given that
background principles go to the threshold determination whether the plaintiff had the property right
alleged to be taken." Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29; John R. Sand, 60 Fed. Cl. at 235; Kim
v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 318 (N.Y. 1997)).
461. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)). The Court in Lucas seemed to reject notions of changing times and the
need to produce changing property rights. See Sax, supra note 142, at 945.
462. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
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463

background principles defense to a takings claim.
The public trust doctrine
protects public rights to access and use those resources to varying degrees based
on state law.464 Thus, the public trust laws of each state shape a background
principles defense to a takings claim related to public beach access.465 Likewise,
the federal equal footing doctrine and a sovereignty theory are relevant to this
defense because they inform the threshold question of whether the plaintiff had
the property right alleged to be taken. 466
A consideration related to such a defense is whether back round principles
evolve over time or whether they are fixed at a certain point.
Lucas did not
necessarily adopt a static view of background principles because the Court
observed that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was
previously permissible no longer so." 4 6 8
Additionally, "there is no physical taking when the plaintiff voluntarily
entered into a highly regulated field in which there was no reasonable
expectation of being free of invasion when certain events occur." 4 69 The fact
that coastal property is highly regulated and contingent on public trust rights and
the federal navigation servitude, as well as continually being reshaped by natural
forces, should inform whether a property owner has a reasonable expectation of
being free from invasion.
Thus, in low-water mark states-or even in high-water mark states-in
which a private title sets boundaries below the ordinary high-water mark, the
existence of a public trust easement in the public/private beach zone would
constitute such a preexisting limitation on the private title.470 The issue is
inextricably tied to the concept that the state's trust responsibilities limit its
sovereignty and prevent it from completely divesting trust property. 471 As noted,
some state supreme courts assert that it is beyond the power of the state to pass
trust property into private ownership freed of public rights. 47 2 Several key state

463. See Echeverria,supra note 452, at 955. In that article, Professor Echeverria argued that a
property owner is not entitled to engage in an activity that harms trust resources. Id.
464. See id. at 959.
465. See id. at 967.
466. See id.
467. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
468. See id.
469. Meltz, supra note 453, at 38 (noting that "RTC's occupation and seizure of failed S&L is
not taking, given the absence of 'historically rooted expectations' of compensation in such
circumstances" (citing Cal. Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
470. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 78 (Mich. 2005) (concluding that "[b]ecause
private littoral title remains subject to the public trust, no taking occurs when the state protects and
retains that which it could not alienate: public rights held pursuant to the public trust doctrine").
471. See id.
472. See, e.g., Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 78 (stating that states cannot alienate pubic trust rights);
R.W. Docks & Slips v. Dep't of Natural Res., 628 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Wis. 2001) (providing that the
state holds title to the beds of lakes, ponds, and rivers in trust to preserve for the public forever the
enjoyment of those bodies of water (quoting State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Wis. 1987)));
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting 145 N.W. 816, 819 (Wis. 1914) (holding that the private title under
the navigable river could not include the right to exclude the public from exercising public trust
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supreme court decisions have addressed how this public trust easement weakens
takings claims in the public/private beach zone: the private coastal estate has
always been conditioned, limited, and regulated.473 The Michigan Supreme
Court summed it up: "The state cannot take what it already owns.
Following
the Michigan approach, background principles of property and public trust law
inhere in the title and, therefore, limit a private property owner's right to exclude
the public from the public/private beach zone.
This Part begins by focusing on a New Hampshire Supreme Court advisory
opinion about a proposed state statute that would impact both the public/private
beach zone, as well as the dry uplands above the high-tide line. In Opinion of
the Justices, the court analyzed each zone differently, which demonstrates the
divergent property interests in each zone. 476 Then, this Part focuses on beach
access cases in New Jersey and California to show how two densely populated
high-water states have attempted to manage competing private property rights
and public rights on the beaches; it also focuses on the United States Supreme
Court's reaction to California's approach in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm 'n.477 This discussion illuminates the boundaries of takings claims related
to public beach access, as well as recreation on the uplands and in the
public/private beach zone.
1. New Hampshire
Unlike the neighboring states of Maine and Massachusetts, New Hampshire
draws the private property boundary at the high-tide line.478 Two years after the
Supreme Court decided Lucas, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rendered its
Opinion of the Justices decision, analyzing a proposed state statute that aimed to
"recognize and confirm the historical practice and common law right of the
public to enjoy the existing public easement" along New Hampshire's coasts.479
To this end, the proposed legislation articulated a recreational easement in the
public/private beach zone and a separate public easement in the dry sand area
above the high-water mark.480

rights because "[i]t is beyond the power of the state to alienate [the river bed] freed from such
rights" (citing People v. N.Y. & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 73-74 (1877); Priewe v. Wis.
State Land & Improvement Co., 79 N.W. 780, 782 (Wis. 1899); FARNHAM, supra note 138, at
172)).
473. See cases cited supra note 472.
474. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 78.
475. See id. at 74, 75, 78.
476. See Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 608 (N.H. 1994).
477. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
478. Compare Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d at 608 (high-tide line private boundary), with
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 628 (Me. 2011) (low-water mark private boundary), and
Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass. 1961) (low-water
mark private boundary).
479. See Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d at 606.
480. See id. at 609-10.
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With regard to the recreational easement in the public/private beach zone,
the justices grounded their analysis in English common law and the easement
concept of a divided estate with separatejus privatum andjus publicum.481 After
the court declared that New Hampshire has always recognized public ownership
below the high-water mark,482 it explained that public ownership overlaps with
private littoral owners' rights to use this zone and access the water. 48 While
overlapping, the court clarified that private rights may not "unreasonably
interfere with the rights of the public." 4
Further, public rights in New Hampshire are not restricted to traditional
navigation and fishing, as they are in neighboring Massachusetts. 485 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court embraced an evolving theory of common law public
rights, explaining that these traditional public rights "are not the whole estate but
rather the public trust lands are held for the use and benefit of all the [public], for
all useful purposes ... 486 The court reasoned that because the phrase "all
useful purposes" is broad enough to encompass the right to recreate, the
proposed statute would merely codify the existing common law. 487
In addition to recreation fitting within the contours of a public use right for
all useful purposes, the court stated that a recreational right in the public/private
beach zone is the same as the previously recognized public rights on the water to
"boat, bathe, fish, fowl, skate, and cut ice."4 88 Thus, while New Hampshire
applies an evolving theory of common law public rights by employing the openended concept of using the lands for all useful purposes, the court also tied the
recreational use to already recognized uses-albeit ones that are not necessarily
part of the traditional triumvirate.489 The court framed a recreational public use
as a preexisting burden on private title, concluding that this part of the proposed
legislation was simply a codification of the common law: "Where private title to
tidelands is already burdened by preexisting public rights, a regulation designed

481. See id. at 607-08 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11, 13 (1894)).
482. Id. at 608 ("[T]he introduction of any line other than high-water mark as the marine
boundary would overturn common-law rights that had been established here, by a usage and
traditional understanding of two hundred years' duration." (quoting Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson,
25 A. 718, 730-31 (N.H. 1890) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
483. See id at 609.
484. See id
485. Compare Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d at 609 (recognizing public rights that extend
beyond just navigation and fishing to include "all useful purposes," including recreational uses)
(quoting Concord,25 A. at 721), with Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 173 N.E.2d
273, 277 (Mass. 1961) (restricting public rights to the "acknowledged public powers in the
navigable waters" of navigation and fishing).
486. Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d at 609 (quoting Concord, 25 A. at 721) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
487. See id
488. See id. (quoting Concord,25 A. at 721) (citing Hartford v. Town of Gilmanton, 146 A.2d
851, 853 (N.H. 1958)). These public uses, the court added, "include recreational uses." Id.
489. See id. (quoting Concord,25 A. at 721) (citing Hartford,A.2d at 853).
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to protect those same rights will not constitute a taking of property without just
compensation." 490
Thus, in New Hampshire, a statute may recognize recreational rights in the
public/private beach zone based on the public trust doctrine; however, a statute
providing access to lands above this line is an unconstitutional taking because
the public trust easement does not similarly burden uplands. 491 Instead of
attempting to open the dry sand uplands based on the public trust doctrine, the
proposed New Hampshire statute aimed to protect recreation across the dry sand
area above the public/private beach zone based on a public prescriptive
easement. 492 If a prescriptive easement exists, it might well represent a
background principle that would defeat a takings claim.
The justices examined the factual difficulties in establishing a statewide
prescriptive easement-which required a showing of adverse use on each tract
for twenty years-stating that such an assertion was not within the power of the
legislature, but rather, was reserved to the judiciary to decide on a case-by-case
basis.493 Because this part of the proposed law denied private property owners
the right to exclude others from property that was not burdened by a background
principle of state law, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that this
section of the statute would be a taking without just compensation.494 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.495 The justices suggested that if the
state wanted to create a comprehensive beach access program for the upland
portion of beaches, the legislature had to use its powers of eminent domain and
496
compensate private property owners.

490. Id. Interestingly, this decision came two years after Lucas but did not cite that U.S.
Supreme Court takings decision.
491. See id.
492. See id. at 610. According to the court: "To establish a prescriptive easement, the plaintiff
must prove by a balance of probabilities twenty years' adverse, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
land [claimed] in such a manner as to give notice to the record owner that an adverse claim was
being made to it." Id. (quoting Mastin v. Prescott, 444 A.2d 556, 558 (N.H. 1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
493. See id. (citing Mastin, 444 A.2d at 558; 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL

PROPERTY § 34.11[6], at 34-128 to 34-128.1 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000)).
494. See id. at 611 (citing Bell y. Town of Wells (Bell l), 557 A.2d 168, 178 (Me. 1989)).
495. See id. (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987)).
496. See id. Current New Hampshire law regulating beach access follows the 1994 Opinion of
the Justices, providing:
Public access to public waters means legal passage to any of the public waters of the state
by way of designated contiguous land owned or controlled by a state agency, assuring
that all members of the public shall have access to and use of the public waters for
recreational purposes.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271:20-a(I) (LexisNexis 2008). The purpose of section 483-C:1 in the
New Hampshire statutes-which regulates public use of coastal shorelands-is "to recognize and
confirm the historical practice and common law right of the public to enjoy the greatest portion of
New Hampshire coastal shoreland, in accordance with the public trust doctrine subject to those
littoral rights recognized at common law." Id. § 483-C:1(I). Additionally, "[a]ny person may use
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New Jersey

In contrast to New Hampshire, New Jersey recognizes broad public
recreational rights on the upland portion of beaches, grounding this recognition
in the public trust doctrine.
In New Jersey, the state holds tidal lands in trust
up to the mean high-tide line. 4 98 However, New Jersey has gone farther than
most other states in articulating a public trust doctrine that protects public
recreational rights not only in the public/private beach zone, but also on private
upland beach areas above the high-tide line under some circumstances.4 99
New Jersey's courts have produced a collection of beach access decisions
that arose out of various scenarios whereby the entity controlling the beach
opened it to recreational use by only some people and sought to give preference
to residents or to entirely exclude nonresidents. oo In Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea,

01

the court held that, "while municipalities may

validly charge reasonable fees for the use of their beaches, they may not
discriminate in any respect between their residents and non-residents." 502 The
New Jersey Supreme Court based its holding on the public trust doctrine, which
it described as a "deeply inherent right of the citizenry. ,,503 In that cs
case, a
municipality owned a beach park and boardwalk located on the dry uplands part
of the beach, while the state held in trust the beach from the high-tide line to the
ocean. 504 The municipality charged nonresidents more to access its municipal
beach, access to which was necessary to reach the state-held public/private beach
zone. 505

the public trust coastal shorelands of New Hampshire for all useful and lawful purposes, to include
recreational purposes, subject to the provisions of municipal ordinances relative to the 'reasonable
use' of public trust shorelands." Id. § 483-C:1(Ill).
497. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J.
1972).
498. Id. at 56 (Francis, J., dissenting).
499. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984); Borough
ofNeptune City, 294 A.2d at 56 (Francis, J., dissenting). Oregon also recognizes public rights to
use upland beach areas, but bases this recognition on custom rather than the public trust doctrine.
See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969).
500. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358 (involving a nonprofit association that restricted beach
access to members who were residents of Bay Head); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571,
572, 574 (N.J. 1978) (involving a municipality that dedicated beach for residents only); Borough of
Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 55 (addressing an ordinance by a municipality that charged higher beach
usage fee to nonresidents).
501. 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
502. Id. at 55. The court stated that "where the upland sand area is owned by a municipalitya political subdivision and creature of the state-and dedicated to public beach purposes, a modem
court must take the view that the public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters
must be open to all on equal terms and without preference and that any contrary state or municipal
action is impermissible." Id at 54.
503. See id. at 53.
504. See id. at 49.
505. See id. at 50-51.
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The court rooted its decision in English common law and accounted for the
original federal transfer of property to New Jersey. 506 The case provides an
important articulation of the scope of public rights protected by the trust doctrine
in New Jersey.507 Unlike courts that fix public rights as those recognized at the
508
time of statehood or earliero,
or courts that describe beach walking as part of
the traditional public right of passage,509 New Jersey explicitly subscribes to a
common law theory that evolves along with a changing society:
We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the
twentieth century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the
ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as well to
recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore
activities. The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles,
should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and
extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was
created to benefit. 1 o
Following this evolving theory of public rights, the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the inclusion of shore activities and recreation as public rights in
its subsequent decision in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n.

In

Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court retraced the origins of public rights to
access the sea through ancient Roman law and English common law.

The

court affirmed Borough of Neptune City's extension of the public trust doctrine
to include bathing, swimming, and other shore activities as furthering and
consistent with the state's "general welfare."513 It also quoted approvingly from
the Florida Supreme Court as follows:

506. See id. at 51.
507. See id. at 53-54.
508. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell ll), 557 A.2d 168, 171, 173 (Me. 1989) (concluding
that long and firmly established principles of property law, as received into the common law of
Massachusetts, established that private property was subject only to the public rights of fishing,
fowling, and navigation); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974) (declaring that
the rights reserved to the public are those preserved by the Colonial Ordinance, which specifies that
the public is to retain the rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation).
509. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005) (providing that "walking
along the lake shore is inherent in the exercise of traditionally protected public rights of fishing,
hunting, and navigation"); West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d 601, 617, 618 (N.C. 1985) (stating that "[t]he
long standing right of the public to pass over and along the strip of land lying between the highwater mark and the low-water mark ... is well established beyond need of citation").
510. Borough ofNeptune City, 294 A.2d at 54; see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (concluding that the public trust is not "fixed or static, but one
to be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to
benefit" (quoting Borough ofNeptune City, 294 A.2d at 47)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
511. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365-66.
512. See id. at 360-63 (citations omitted).
513. See id. at 363.
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The constant enjoyment of this privilege [bathing in salt waters] of thus
using the ocean and its fore-shore for ages without dispute should prove
sufficient to establish it as an American common law right, similar to
that of fishing in the sea, even if this right had not come down to us as a
part of the English common law, which it undoubtedly has. 514
The New Jersey Supreme Court understood the import of its prior decision
in Borough of Neptune City as recognizing that, to exercise the recreational
rights guaranteed by the public trust doctrine, "the public must have access to
municipally-owned dry sand areas as well as the fore-shore."
These areas of
the beach are "inseparable." 516 Similarly, Van Ness v. Borough ofDeal,517 which
was decided only a few years after Borough of Neptune City, stands for the
proposition that the public trust doctrine requires "the public be afforded the
right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality."518
In those cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court was not only moved by an
evolving theory of public rights on trust property, but also articulated a doctrine
that burdens adjacent municipal upland beaches that may be necessary to access
and exercise public recreational rights. 519 Then, in Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass 'n, the court went beyond municipally-owned upland beaches

and considered whether the public trust doctrine similarly required either a right
of passage across private uplands to access the public/private beach zone or
recreational use of the dry upland beach owned by a nonprofit beach club.520
This beach club owned or leased the dry sand beach uplands and limited
membership to municipal residents. 521 The club controlled public access to
much of the beach along the Atlantic Ocean in the Borough of Bay Head because
it owned the beachfront adjacent to seven of the nine roads in the Borough that
ended at the beach.522
In reaching its landmark holding that extended the public trust doctrine to
private upland beaches, the court was persuaded by a dissenting opinion in an
English case from 1821, Blundell v. Catterall,523 in which Justice Best described
bathing in tidal waters as similar to naviation and "passage to the seashore" as
"essential to the exercise of that right."
Relying on the Blundell dissent, the

514. Id. (quoting White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 449 (Fla. 1939)).
515. See id.
516. See id.
517. 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978).
518. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363 (citing Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 573-74).
519. See supra notes 502-18 and accompanying text.
520. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358. The court characterized the beach club as a "quasipublic body." Id.
521. See id. at 359.
522. See id.
523. [1821] 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B.); 5 B. & Ald. 268.
524. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364 (quoting Blundell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1193, 1194; 5 B. & Ald.
at 274-75 (Best, J., dissenting)).
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court noted that Justice Best called disruption of this passage a public
nuisance. 525 The court also pointed to the dissent's memorable warning that if
the English court restricted the public's right to walk across the beach to access
the water, "it will take from the people what is essential to their welfare, whilst it
will give to individuals only the hateful privilege of vexing their neighbours
[sic].,,526
Drawing on this reasoning, the Matthews court held that the public trust
doctrine requires private beach owners to accommodate the public's right of
passage to access the ocean, as well as the public's right to recreate on dry
upland beaches.527 The court reasoned that not only would the public's right to
access the ocean be meaningless without access across the upland beach to reach
the foreshore,528 but the "complete pleasure of swimming must be accompanied
by intermittent periods of rest and relaxation beyond the water's edge," the
absence of which may "eliminate the right to the recreational use of the
ocean."529 Moreover, the court stated that, "where use of dry sand is essential or
reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the ocean, the doctrine warrants the
public's use of the upland dry sand area subject to an accommodation of the
interests of the owner." 530
The court cautioned, however, that this rule does not mean the public has an
"unrestricted right to cross at will over any and all property bordering on the
common property."531 The determination of what privately owned beaches are
"required to satisfy the public's rights" depends on a balancing of multiple
factors aimed at determining whether the public has "reasonable access" to the
foreshore. 532 These factors include the location of the dry sand area in relation to
the foreshore, the extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, the
nature and extent of the public demand, and the usage of the upland beach by the
owner. 533 The court's ruling did not open all privately-owned beaches to the
public, but it did expose private beaches to a possible right of access or right of

525. Id. at 364-65 (quoting Blundell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1197; 5 B. & Ald. at 287 (Best, J.,
dissenting)).
526. See id. at 364 (citing Blundell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1197; 5 B & Ald. at 287 (Best, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Paradoxically, the majority opinion in Blundell was
often cited in U.S. courts during that time for the position that "recreation was not a trust purpose
that would support public use of waterways or adjacent riparian tidelands." Rose, supra note 26, at
757 (citing Nolan v. Rockaway Park Improvement Co., 28 N.Y.S. 102, 103 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1894)).
527. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364-65 (quoting Blundell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1197; 5 B. & Ald.
at 287 (Best, J., dissenting)).
528. See id. at 365-66.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 364.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 364.
533. Id. at 365-66.
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use incidental to the bathing and swimming right-depending on the
circumstances. 534
An evolving theory of common law public rights clearly motivated the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Matthews, just as it had in Borough ofNeptune City.535
The court saw the public trust doctrine as malleable enough to retain relevancy
to changing social conditions, stating that "[a]rchaic judicial responses are not an
answer to a modern social problem."5 36 However, the court's heavy emphasis on
English common law indicated that the New Jersey Supreme Court, similar to
courts in New Hampshire and Michigan,537 wanted to anchor public rights in
more traditional legal bases.538
None of these cases, however, directly addressed a takings claim in relation
to public trust access to private lands. In NationalAss 'n ofHome Builders of the
United States v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,

the

court considered the meaning of the Matthews factor test in relation to a takings
claim under the U.S. Constitution.540 The Homebuilders Association brought a
takings challenge to a New Jersey rule requiring property owners to construct
and maintain a thirty-foot-wide public walkway along the entire waterfront of
their property as a condition of obtaining a development permit.541 Most of the
land on which the walkway was to be constructed was former trust land that had
been filled, but some of the land had not previously been trust land, and the court
applied a different standard based on that distinction.5 42
As to the filled trust lands, the court subscribed to a sovereignty theory.543
The court held that this land was still burdened by the trust and the private
owners did not have the right to exclude the public from this property: the
private owners' "bundle of rights is limited by the public's riht to use and enjoy
this portion of the property under the public trust doctrine."
The court denied
a takings challenge to the public trust portion of the property. 545 As to the nontrust uplands, upon which the state required perpendicular access to reach the
waterway, the court held the applicable analysis was the Matthews "reasonably

534. See id. at 369.
535. Id. at 365 (citing Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47,
54 (N.J. 1972)).
536. See id.
537. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005); Opinion of the Justices, 649
A.2d 604, 609-10 (N.H. 1994) (quoting Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 721 (N.H.
1890) (citing Hartford v. Town of Gilmanton, 146 A.2d 851, 853 (N.H. 1958)).
538. See Borough ofNeptune City, 294 A.2d at 51.
539. 64 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999).
540. See id. at 359.
541. Id. at 356.
542. See id. at 357-59.
543. See id. at 357-58.
544. See id. at 358.
545. See id.
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necessary" factors, instead of the Supreme Court's takings test in Dolan v. City
546

of Tigard.

In summary, New Jersey's decisions are heavily infused with a sovereignty
theory that finds an inalienable public trust easement, coupled with a theory of
evolving public rights. In New Jersey, public trust rights include a general right
to engage in recreational activities on state-held trust lands in the public/private
beach zone;.547 a right to access upland municipal beaches, subject to reasonable
regulation; 548 a right of passage; and a right to engage in recreational activities
on privately owned beaches, in accordance with a multifactor test aimed at
determining whether use of private lands is necessary for "reasonable access" to
the public/private beach zone. 5 o Further, even on filled trust lands, the public
trust is not extinguished and still provides background principles of state law that
not only limit a landowner's ability to exclude the public, but also authorize the
state to require the landowner to construct and maintain public walkways along
the waterfront.
3.

California

In California, the state clearly holds in trust all tidelands between the mean
high-tide and low-tide lines, submerged lands, and the beds of inland navigable
waters. This trust for public uses goes well beyond the traditional triumvirate of
fishing, navigation, and commerce to include "nature preserves, swimming,
boating, and walking." 552 The California constitution guarantees the public's
right of access to tidelands, subject to reasonable regulation.553 Moreover,
through the state constitution, private property owners are also put on notice that
no one possessing the "frontage" of any "navigable water in this State, shall be
permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for
any public purpose."554 Finally, the California constitution directs that the
legislature "shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this
provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall be always

546. See id. at 360 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)). The court then held
that it lacked the factual record to determine whether the Matthews "reasonably necessary" test had
been met. See id.
547. See supra notes 511-12 and accompanying text.
548. See supra note 502 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 528-31 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 533-35 and accompanying text. A takings issue was not analyzed or
decided by any of these New Jersey cases. Although Matthews involved a privately owned beach,
the owner was a beach club and the remedy was opening the club membership to nonresidents of
the municipality. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 369 (N.J. 1984).
551. See Nat'lAss'n ofHome Builders, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 357-59.
552. CAL. COASTAL COMM'N, BEACHES AND PARKS FROM SAN FRANcIsCO TO MONTEREY

11 (2012), availableat http://www.coastal.ca.gov/books/12011.intro.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
553. CAL. CONST. art. 10, § 4.
554. Id.
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attainable for the people thereof."555 Thus, California goes further than most
other states in providing protections for the public's right to access and walk
along the public/private beach zone.
In furtherance of these state constitutional rights, the California Coastal Act
establishes a state goal and directive in the coastal zone to "[m]aximize public
access to and along the coast and maximize public recreational opportunities in
the coastal zone consistent with sound resources conservation principles and
constitutionally protected rights of private property owners."556
To this end, the California Coastal Commission operates a coastal access
program that includes, as a program priority, creating a California coastal trail to
increase public access to the entire California coast.557 The commission
researches and records prescriptive public access easements,'558 obtains
easements from private property owners across the dry sand beaches,559 and
produces maps showing the public the location of these access points. 560
Additionally, the legislature enacted a statute expressly providing, with some
exceptions, that "[p]ublic access from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline
and along the coast shall be provided in new development projects."561
In the dispute that gave rise to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Nollan v. California CoastalCommission,562 the state commission argued that it
was carrying out its guidelines to further these constitutional and statutory
objectives.
When reviewing the proposal to rebuild and expand a home along
the Pacific Coast, the California Coastal Commission conditioned its approval on
the property owner granting an easement for the public to cross a strip of private
beach above the mean high-tide line, but below a seawall that ran parallel to the
ocean. 564
The Supreme Court reviewed this action in Nollan and ultimately held that
565
the easement condition constituted a taking of property.
The decision is as
important for what it held as for what it ignored. Justice Scalia's majority
opinion simply mentioned, at the outset, that the border of the private property is
the "historic mean high-tide line" at the ocean, with no reference to the public

555. Id.
556. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001.5(c) (West 2007).
557. See Coastal Access Program, CAL. COASTAL COMM'N, http://www.coastal.ca.gov/
access/acendx.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).

558. See Coastal Access Program: Prescriptive Rights Program, CAL. COASTAL COMM'N,
http://www.coastal.ca.gov/access/prc-access.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) ("California law
provides that under certain conditions, long term public access across private property may result in
the establishment of a permanent public easement. This is called a public prescriptive right of
access.").

559. Id.
560. See id.
561. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE

§ 30212(a)

(West 2007).

562. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
563. See id. at 857-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
564. Id. at 828 (majority opinion).
565. See id. at 838-39.
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trust doctrine. 566 Although property law is defined by the state, the opinion
largely dismissed California's constitutional guarantees of public access to the
ocean. 567
Instead, the Court focused on the existence of a physical occupation of
land. 568 According to the Court, had the commission simply required the
Nollans to provide a public easement, extinguishing their right to exclude on the
easement path, then "no doubt there would have been a taking." 569 The question
the Court wrestled with was whether requiring an easement as a condition for
issuing a land use permit was a taking.s57 The Court assumed, without deciding,
that it was a legitimate state interests to allow the public to see the beach to
"overcome [the] 'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a
developed shorefront, and prevent[] congestion on the public beaches."572
However, the court stated that there must be a "nexus" between the land use
condition and the legitimate public purpose.573 Given the facts of the case, the
Court held that because it was "quite impossible" to see a nexus between a
permit condition that allows people who are "already on the public beaches [to]
be able to walk across the Nollans' property" and the stated purpose of reducing
"obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house," the commission's
actions constituted a taking.574
In establishing a nexus test, the Supreme Court did not foreclose a state's
ability to impose land use conditions that expand public access to privately
owned beaches above the public/private beach zone.575 Since Nollan, the
California Coastal Commission has continued to require the "dedication of
easements or payment of mitigation fees as a condition of building permits," but
it requires the "dedications to meet the Supreme Court's essential nexus test." 576

566. See id. at 827.
567. See id. at 832. The majority opinion dismissed California law on this point by stating,
"Most obviously, the right of way sought here is not naturally described as one to navigable water
(from the street to the sea) but along it." Id.
568. See id.
569. Id. at 831. Justice Brennan disagreed with this point in his dissent, characterizing such an
easement as "a mere restriction" on the property's use. See id. at 848 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
570. See id. at 834 (majority opinion).
571. In Nollan, the Court emphasized that a land use regulation "does not effect a taking if it
substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically
viable use of his land." Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, the Court subsequently excised this standard from takings
litigation in Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005). See also Meltz, supra note
453, at 2 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. 528; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (discussing the development and
demise of the substantive due process test).
572. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835.
573. See id. at 837.
574. See id. at 838.
575. See id. at 836-37 (recognizing that a land use prohibition, or a land use condition
substituted for the prohibition, designed to protect the public's interests is a legitimate exercise of
the police power rather than a taking).
576. See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 26, at 93 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837).
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In addition to an essential nexus, if such conditions are placed on land use
decisions, there also needs to be a "rough proportionality" between the condition
and the nature and extent of the proposed development's impact.
This
decision does not go as far as a United States district court did in New Jersey:
this court found that there would be no taking if the state action is in accord with
the "reasonably necessary" factors established by the Matthews public trust
doctrine decision.
4.

Concluding Observations: Takings and Public Access

Heavily populated ocean coastal states have been the most active in defining
public access to beaches. The above examples from New Hampshire, New
Jersey, and California illustrate divergent approaches and analyses of state action
to provide public access to beaches within and above the public/private beach
zone. 579 These cases also articulate an approach to public trust rights that is
expansive enough to go beyond beach walking to encompass general beach
recreation. 580 While New Hampshire applies an evolving theory of public rights
to protect "all useful purposes" on trust lands and New Jersey explicitly rejects
an "archaic judicial response," 582 both state supreme courts are unwilling to
completely abandon tradition. Even assuming that courts have the authority to
revise background principles of state law-in a manner consistent with
Lucas583-when they assert that authority, it is prudent to ground revised,
modem conceptions of background principles in traditional rules as much as
possible. To the extent that the common law can evolve to stay relevant, it
should evolve in gradual, incremental steps.
Thus, New Hampshire describes the recreational right in the public/private
beach zone as one that has always existed, reasoning that a statute that codifies
such a right could not give rise to a takings claim by adjacent private property
owners because the new law would not change any burdens on private
property. 584
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that it was not bound by
tradition, it too searched for traditional support for a recreational right and a right
of access to cross privately owned upland beaches. 585 The New Jersey Supreme
Court found such support in a dissenting opinion that does not reflect the

577. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
578. Nat'1 Ass'n of Home Builders of the U.S. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d
354, 359, 360 (D.N.J. 1999).
579. See supra Part V.C. 1-3.
580. See supra Part V.C. 1-3.
581. See Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 609 (N.H. 1994) (quoting Concord Mfg. Co.
v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 721 (N.H. 1890)).
582. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
583. See supra notes 454-68 and accompanying text.
584. See Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d at 609.
585. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363-65 (citations omitted).
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accepted English common law in the 1800s, but nonetheless provides an
argument that, historically, the public has been able to cross private land to reach
the sea for bathing. 586 In holding that public trust rights may burden privately
owned beaches above the mean high-tide line, the court relied on the public trust
doctrine and rejected theories based on prescription, dedication, or custom. 587
Unlike New Jersey, New Hampshire's Supreme Court advised that private
uplands are not burdened with the public trust; thus, opening these lands to the
public would take from the private owner the right to exclude others.
Cognizant of the U.S. Supreme Court's Nollan decision, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court reasoned that while the court could determine that private
uplands were open to the public based on a prescriptive easement, such a
determination had to involve a fact-specific inquiry at each beach, and not be
accomplished through statewide legislation.589
In its discussion of property rights on the coast in Nollan, the Supreme Court
applied a lineal title approach to property-but unlike the other cases examined
in this article, the court in Nollan applied the theory above, rather than below,
the high-tide line: the state-held trust lands end and private property begins at the
high-tide line. 590 Any crossing of that line onto private property is either a
physical taking, if a direct public easement,591 or a regulatory taking, if the land
use restriction does not have a nexus that is roughly proportionate to a legitimate
592
public purpose.
Lucas adds another layer of complexity to this analysis,
which should arguably be the starting point: determining whether a public trust
easement is a preexisting condition burdening private coastal titles. 59 Hence, if
a state wants to create a comprehensive beach access program, the methods used
must be consistent with background principles of each state's property and
public trust laws.594 This does not imply that the law must be fixed for all time

586. See id. at 364 (citing Blundell v. Catterall, (1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B.) 1193, 1194;
5 B. & Ald. 268, 274-75, 278 (Best, J., dissenting)).
587. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365 (citing Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59 (Cal.
1970); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 1974); State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 675 (Or. 1969)) (rejecting the need to justify its decision based on
prescription, dedication, or custom instead of the public trust doctrine).
588. See Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d at 611 (quoting Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell Hl),
557 A.2d 168, 178 (Me. 1989)).
589. See id. at 610, 611 (quoting 4 POWELL, supra 493, at § 34.11[6], 34-128 to 34-128.1).
590. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827, 828 (1987).
591. See id. at 831. Justice Brennan disagreed on this point in his dissent, characterizing such
an easement as "a mere restriction" on the property's use. See id. at 848 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
592. See id. at 837 (providing the nexus test); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391
(1994) (providing the rough proportionality test).
593. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
594. The New Jersey decision in NationalAssociation of Home Builders provides an example
of a case where state court-developed public trust factors overrode the Nollan/Dolan takings tests,
but this is an outlier. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders of the U.S. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 64
F. Supp. 2d 354, 358 (D.N.J. 1999); J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the "EssentialNexus":
How State and FederalCourts have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from
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to constitute a background principle.595 Lucas does not require that background
principles must be fixed, but instead, leaves space for the law to evolve with
society.596
VI. TOWARDS A THEORY THAT ACCOMMODATES SHARED BEACHES

Property in land may be seen as consisting of a group of rights, including the
right to possess, use, and dispose of the thing.597 The United States Supreme
Court considers "as to property reserved by its owner for private use, the right to
exclude [others is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property."598 However, beachfront property and the
rights associated with it cannot be accurately understood in isolation from the
longstanding public significance of beaches, the background principles of public
trust and property law that inhere in the title, 599 and the natural forces that
constantly reshape beaches. This property exists in relation to other parcels, the
water, and the members of the public who use coastal areas. As Professor Sax
observed about property more generally:
Particular parcels are tied to one another in complex ways, and property
is more accurately described as being inextricably part of a network of
relationships that is neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the
property boundaries with which the legal system is accustomed to
dealing. Frequently, use of any given parcel of property is at the same
time effectively a use of, or a demand upon, property beyond the border
of the user.600
Although this observation applies to all property in land, the network
concept is even more pronounced when applied to coastal property. This is
because coastal property is the place where private land ownership-primarily in
uplands-exists alongside the lake and ocean commons, which are clearly held
by the public.601 The public/private beach zone of coastal property is where

Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373, 381 (2002) (noting that, in the years since Dolan, lower courts
have consistently applied the essential nexus test to land use exactions similar to those challenged in
Nollan and Dolan).
595. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.

596. See id. The Lucas Court observed that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may
make what was previously permissible no longer so." Id.
597. Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 611 (N.H. 1994) (citing Burrows v. City of Keene,
432 A.2d 15, 19 (N.H. 1981)).
598. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (quoting Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
599. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-31.
600. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152

(1971).
601. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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these interests overlap and intersect.602 Consider a few examples of this network
concept applied to coastal properties.
A lakefront property owner who launches fireworks from the portion of the
beach she owns to explode and deposit the refuse into the lake necessarily
invades the quiet experience of neighboring lakefront property owners on their
private land and deposits waste into the shared public lake.
Similarly, a lakefront property owner who removes all coastal vegetation
and fertilizes a grass lawn down to the shore accelerates algae growth in the lake,
thus using her property in a way that degrades the common lake property and
impairs the rights of the public and neighboring private property owners to enjoy
clean water.
Conversely, an all-terrain vehicle enthusiast drives on the public/private
beach zone, disturbing private property abutting the shore, as well as other
members of the public who share use and enjoyment of the beach.
Lastly, the state creates a harbor and installs docks to aid in the public's
navigation, while simultaneously increasing the value of neighboring properties.
These examples show that, especially in the public/private beach zone,
public and private property uses interact with and burden one another. A legal
theory that acknowledges the notion of intertwined and networked uses of this
shared property is more compatible with the need to accommodate different, yet
interconnected, public and private uses of the public/private beach zone.
Such a theory will also be more amenable to mediating conflicting and
damaging uses of coastal property. One of the values of the sovereignty theory,
which leads to finding an inalienable public trust easement, is that it places an
obligation on the state to prevent and protect the public from offending property
uses in the public/private beach zone and in the water commons.
This
protection of the public interest has a Tositive spillover effect on the protection
of private property interests as well.60 This theory can lend itself to proactive,
preventive state action to regulate multiple uses of the beach, rather than a
reliance on litigation of nuisance claims after the fact.
All of the cases analyzed in this Article involve conflicts between the
public's ability to enjoy beaches and a private property owner's right to exclude.
Often unrecognized is the impact that these public trust decisions have on other
coastal property owners. A lineal title approach has disturbing implications for
605
Although riparian/littoral rights include shared
private coastal landowners.
use of the waters of a lake or ocean with other riparians, they do not include
shared use of the shoreline.606 Paradoxically, decisions that favor the private fee

602. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
603. See City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927).
604. See id.

605. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
606. See Kalo, supra note 23, at 1435 (listing littoral rights and not including right of shared
use of shore with other littoral owners) (quoting JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAININ THE UNITED STATES § 100, at 128-30 (3d ed. 1909)).
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owner's right to exclude others from the public/private beach zone grant fewer
use rights to littoral or riparian owners. Private owners of coastal property have
the most frequent access to the beach; yet, these fee owners are restricted to the
frontage they own, rather than granted the use of the entire beach, in a state that
does not recognize the coexistence of the public trust easement with private title.
Further, if a single border is both the end of private property and the beginning
of public rights, a strict lineal title approach would weaken the existence of
607
riparian rights below the border and into the state-held trust waters.
A lineal title approach to understanding the relationship between public and
private property along lakeshores and oceans should be only the starting point: a
method of dividing legal title between the state and private landowners.
This
approach should be followed by finding a public trust easement that protects
public usufructuary rights, even when the public/private beach zone is privately
owned.609 Such recognition is particularly important in low-water states, where
a strict lineal title approach serves to extinguish traditional public rights in the
public/private beach zone.610 The better view, consistent with hundreds of years
of precedent in both American and English common law, is one informed by a
sovereignty theory: it is not within the power of the state to extinguish public
rights in the public/private beach zone.61
Additionally, even in high-water states, deeds may be at variance with this
title division at the mean high-tide line, or ordinary high-water mark, and an
inalienable public trust easement is better suited to simultaneously recognize
individual deeds while not privatizing that which belongs to all-public trust
612
rights.
The variety of water border descriptions in individual deeds in highwater states presents a situation conceptually similar to private ownership claims
in low-water states. In both situations, by applying an easement, the state may

607. See Blumm, supra note 26, at 655-56 (discussing how the lineal theory precluded a
riparian landowner from protecting oysters he planted in Raritan Bay (citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6
N.J.L. 1, 8, 32 (1821))).
608. This is the approach taken by the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio
Department of Natural Resources, 955 N.E.2d 935, 949, 950 (Ohio 2011). The court erred in

assuming, without analysis, that the property line for private title must be the same as the boundary
for public trust purposes. Ken Kilbert, Ohio Supreme CourtDraws a DividingLine on the Scope of
the Public Trust Doctrine, GREAT LAKES LAW (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/

2011/09/ohio-supreme-court-draws-a-dividing-line-on-the-scope-of-the-public-trust-doctrine.html.
609. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005) (holding that beach walking
was contained within traditional public trust rights, despite being on private property).
610. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 898 (discussing how Minnesota allows title to pass to the
littoral owners abutting Lake Superior all the way to the low-water mark, but how this title is
nonetheless burdened by a paramount servitude that applies the public trust to the area below the
ordinary high-water mark).
611. This is the position of the Michigan Supreme Court in Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65, and the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892);

it is also the position of legal scholars, including Professor Robert Abrams. See Abrams, supra note
26, at 898; see also Echeverria,supra note 452, at 951-52 (viewing the public trust doctrine as a
constraint on government authority (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452-55)).
612. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 70, 76.
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maintain public trust rights in the public/private beach zone without
extinguishing private title.
Especially in these situations, the English common
law concept of overlapping jus privatum and jus publicum is instructive as to
how to accommodate the coexistence of multiple rights on the same propertyand has been a serviceable approach throughout the centuries. 614
Thus, the coastal estate is best understood as one that involves severable
private and public rights. Even when a private owner holds title below the highwater or high-tide line, the state does not extinguish public trust rights-which
the state holds in its sovereign capacity as trustee of the property the Federal
A sovereignty
Government granted to it under the equal footing doctrine.
theory is also most consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Illinois
Central and Shively, in which the Court acknowledged state power to alter the
state title boundaries after entering the Union, but conditioned that power on the
preservation of public rights.616
The public/private beach zone is suitable to usufructuary rights, but not to
private possession in the sense of landowners retaining the ability to exclude the
public.
That is not to say, however, that all usufructs should be allowed in this
zone-that determination is bounded by recognized public trust and
riparian/littoral rights. Of the competing theories undergirding the common law
of public trust rights, an evolving theory is most amenable to ensuring that the
public trust doctrine is relevant to society as a modem reconception of traditional
rules. 618 Beach walking has been recognized as a traditional public trust right of
"passage and repassage" by courts applying a fixed theory of the common law,
but it has also been rejected under the same theory.619 A fixed theory not only
yields inconsistent results, but the idea advanced by a small minority of statesthat public rights are forever locked in as those uses that were most important to
society in the seventeenth century-is too rigid a theory to ensure the continued

613. See id. at 70.
614. See id. at 69-70.
615. See id. at 62.
616. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 58 (1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 458
(quoting People v. N.Y. & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 77 (1877)).
617. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365-66 (N.J. 1984)
(applying the concept to dry upland beaches to ensure the public has "reasonable access" to
public/private beach zone); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71 (N.J. 1821) (applying the concept to
reject a trespassing claim on oyster bed); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 819, 820
(Wis. 1914) (applying the concept to reject a trespassing claim on navigable rivers up to the
ordinary high-water mark).
618. See Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Notice and Expectation Under Bounded Uncertainty:
Defining Evolving Property Rights Boundaries Through Public Trust and Takings, 21 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 233, 293 (2008) (arguing that a more structured, yet evolving principle of property rights will
create better notice and help solidify owner and user expectations).
619. Compare Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62 (recognizing beach walking as contained within
traditional public trust rights), with Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974)
(rejecting Massachusetts' right of passage on foot law as not part of traditional public trust rights).
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ability of the law to accommodate future societal needs that are not even
imaginable today.
Although an evolving theory of public trust rights makes private property in
this zone less certain, coastal private rights are less certain than other land
ownership by their very nature.620 Even before the public trust easement is
considered, coastal private lands have ambulatory boundaries that change over
time by forces of nature: some of these natural forces are gradually adding or
removing land (accretion and erosion), suddenly eliminating large swaths or the
entirety of the private parcel by completely submerging it under water
(avulsion), or creating a retreat of water that undermines investments in piers left
high and dry (reliction).621 With the climate-influenced rise of sea levels622 and
623
the lowering of certain lake levels, the ambulatory nature of coastal property
boundaries is even more visible in a shorter timeframe.
VII. CONCLUSION

Coastal properties are in flux due to the forces of nature to which they are
subjected and their relationship to state and federal protections for the public.
They are always subject to the federal government's navigation servitude that
allows private property to be destroyed without compensation.624 In addition,
they are subject to the state's public trust doctrine. 62 Against this universally
understood backdrop of uncertainty in coastal private land ownership, public
trust rights are simply one more acknowledgement that coastal property is
unusually dynamic, and that the public/private beach zone is unsuitable for
permanent, exclusive private ownership.
To view coastal private property rights in isolation from the rights of
neighboring private property owners and adjacent public trust lands is a legal
fiction. The better-reasoned beach access cases tend to view coastal property
rights as conditioned and contingent on an inalienable public trust easement. As
observed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, these coastal properties are

620. See Kalo, supranote 23, at 1437-38 (citing GOULD, supranote 23, at 310-11).
621. See id. (citing GOULD, supranote 23, at 310-11).
622. R.S. Nerem et al., Estimating Mean Sea Level Change from the TOPEX and Jason
Altimeter Missions, 33 MARINE GEODESY 435, 441 (Supp. 2010), available at http://www.

tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01490419.2010.491031.
623. Great Lakes Water Level Observations, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION: GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, http://www.glerl.

noaa.gov/data/now/wlevels/dbd/ (last updated Oct. 28, 2013) (showing below average lake levels
for Lakes Huron and Michigan).
624. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Pisarski, supra note 209, at 313-14 (citations omitted)
(discussing how the United States has authority through the Commerce Clause over control and
improvement of navigation, including the ability to use land within the boundaries of navigable
waters for purposes related to navigation and commerce, regardless of ownership and without
compensation).
625. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 26, at 898 (asserting that states, such as Minnesota, are free
to formulate their own public trust law, but they may not disregard the public trust altogether).
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"encumbered by the public trust doctrine and heavily regulated from the getgo. ,,626
Thus, a sovereignty theory of the public trust doctrine and state power
ensures an inalienable public trust easement in the public/private beach zone,
regardless of the variable terms of individual deeds. This approach allows for
consistency across and between states, and puts private property owners on
notice that coastal property is treated differently under the law. Once coastal
property is understood as contingent on the public trust doctrine and variable by
the forces of nature, it becomes easier to see that an evolving theory of public
rights is most capable of the flexibility the common law needs to adapt to
contemporary challenges.
Finally, the need to protect the public's right to use and enjoy trust lands and
waters must be balanced against the need for private property protections. States
under increasing pressure to open up more beach property to the public are
bounded by the constitutional protections that prohibit a taking of private
property without just compensation. 627 Although not as relevant in the
public/private beach zone, the takings prohibition serves to limit the state from
encroaching above this zone, unless allowed by background principles of state
property and public trust law. 628 A sovereignty theory that finds an inalienable
public trust easement and an evolving common law of public rights is flexible
enough to accommodate shared beaches, while the prohibitions against takings
of property properly prevent the state from overreaching.

626. R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628 N.W. 2d 781, 790 (Wis. 2001).
627. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation").
628. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting a takings claim by a private developer when the city denied approval to build on tidelands
in the public/private beach zone protected by the public trust doctrine); Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders of the U.S. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 360 (D.N.J. 1999) (rejecting a
takings claim by a homebuilders association when a state agency rule required developers to
provide public walkways along the coast based on the public trust doctrine); McQueen v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 146-47, 150, 580 S.E.2d 116, 118, 120 (2003) (rejecting a takings
claim by a landowner when the Coastal Council denied approval to build on oceanfront land that
had become submerged by erosion because it is protected by the public trust doctrine).
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